Slaney prepared an estimate for repair of an aircraft in support of a claim by third parties presented to Ranger Insurance. The company denied the claim on grounds that the claim was fraudulently excessive and sued the insureds and Slaney for bad faith. Slaney's motion for summary judgment was granted and he was dismissed from the suit. The insureds subsequently received a judgment against the company as well as punitive damages for malicious denial of their claim. Slaney then brought this action for malicious prosecution. The trial court denied the company's anti-SLAPP motion after concluding that Slaney presented sufficient evidence to establish a probability of prevailing on his complaint. The appellate court affirms. According to the court, the underlying judgment against the company, which included a finding of malice and an award of punitive damages, demonstrated a potential for recovery in the present case.

The owner of a mini-mall filed a complaint for injunctive relief against Ochoa, alleging he had organized ongoing demonstrations against one of the mall's tenants, a club that produced nude shows. Ochoa filed an anti-SLAPP motion, but a month later the parties stipulated to an injunction that regulated the manner of the demonstrations. Ochoa's motion was tabled to allow time for the injunction to be tested and reviewed by the court. After a month and a half, the trial court, based on testimony about the conduct of the demonstrations, denied the anti-SLAPP motion on the grounds that plaintiffs had succeeded in demonstrating a probability of succeeding on its claim. In a lengthy opinion, the appellate court affirms, ruling that the trial court did not err in considering the same evidence for both the motion to strike and the injunction.

StaffPro filed a  malicious prosecution suit against Elite which responded with an anti-SLAPP motion.  The trial court granted Elite's motion, ruling that StaffPro failed to carry its burden of establishing a probability that it would prevail because it had not shown favorable termination or probable cause.  The appellate court affirmed, holding that a severability analysis is improper in determining whether a malicious prosecution plaintiff has demonstrated favorable termination of an underlying lawsuit. Thus, since the first cause of action in the underlying suit had not terminated in favor of StaffPro, it could not demonstrate favorable termination, and therefore could not prevail in its malicious prosecution suit. 

Majorino and O'Brien sued several people after they were allegedly assaulted during a party at a private home. The home's owners were among the named defendants; the owners tendered their defense to State Farm under their homeowner policy. State Farm then filed an action for declaratory relief, seeking a judicial determination of its duty to indemnify the homeowners. In turn, Majorino and O'Brien filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that State Farm's action was designed to chill their right to petition for legal redress. The trial court denied the motion, and the appellate court affirmed, concluding that Majorino and O'Brien had failed to demonstrate that State Farm's action for declaratory relief qualified as a SLAPP under &sect425.16. "[T]he act which underlies and forms the basis for State Farm's declaratory relief action is not the personal injury lawsuit filed by appellants, but the [homeowners'] tender of the defense of that lawsuit under a policy that contains an arguably applicable exclusionary clause."

(Re: defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's appeal) (Case summary in preparation.)

(Case summary in preparation.)

(Case summary in preparation.)

In response to Pueblo's lawsuit against it, Sylmar filed a cross-complaint alleging fraud among other actions. Pueblo filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the cross-complaint for fraud. Before the hearing on the motion, Sylmar filed an amended cross-complaint. The trial court granted the anti-SLAPP motion. On appeal Sylmar argued that its amended cross-complaint made the anti-SLAPP motion moot. The appellate court holds that a plaintiff may not avoid a hearing on an anti-SLAPP motion by filing an amended pleading, and thus, if the motion is granted, may not avoid the mandatory award of costs and attorney fees to the SLAPP target.

(Case summary in preparation.)

Appellant Tendler obtained a pre-lawsuit discovery order in an Ohio state court directed to Google, from whom he sought to learn the identities of the anonymous individuals who had posted statements about him on the Internet that he believed were defamatory. Tendler then filed a request for subpoenas in Santa Clara County Superior Court premised on the Ohio discovery order. The anonymous individuals filed an anti-SLAPP motion. The court held that a request for a subpoena is not a "cause of action," and therefore cannot be subject to an anti-SLAPP motion. In his concurrence, Justice McAdams urged the Legislature to consider whether the anti-SLAPP law should be expanded to include such third-party subpoena requests. As of Jan. 1, 2009, amendments to Code of Civil Procedure sections 1987.1 and 1987.2 provide that in a successful motion to quash such a subpoena, the court shall award the amount of the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, incurred in making the motion.

Plaintiffs, employees of Davis Community Church, sued the church and others for defamation and emotional distress, alleging that church officials falsely accused them of having an inappropriate sexual relationship with a minor in the course of their church work. The trial court granted defendants' anti-SLAPP motion. The appellate court affirms the order, concluding that private communications concerning issues of public interest are protected by the anti-SLAPP statute (see Averill v. Superior Court) and plaintiffs had not demonstrated a probability of prevailing on their claims.

This case arose because of a split in the ranks of organized cat breeders. The founder of The Traditional Cat Assn., Inc. sued defendants for allegedly defamatory statements published on their website. The trial court denied defendants' anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint, concluding that plaintiffs had demonstrated a probability of prevailing on their complaint. The court's decision was based on its ruling that defendants' statute of limitations defense in their anti-SLAPP motion was not a proper issue for determination under the terms of the anti-SLAPP statute. The appellate court finds this conclusion erroneous. Moreover, it rejects plaintiffs' argument that a cause of action for defamation arising from statements posted on a website arises continuously while the website is operating, holding that the single publication rule in the law of defamation applies to statements published on websites. Because defendants posted the alleged defamatory statements more than a year before plaintiffs filed their complaint, the action for defamation is barred by the statute of limitations. This is the first California court to adopt the single-publication rule for web publishing.

Quintero was part of organized public protests against Thomas, his landlord. After Quintero and others appeared at Thomas's church, Thomas took action against Quintero by filing a petition seeking injunctive relief against civil harassment (Civil Code § 527.6). Quintero responded with an anti-SLAPP motion, which the trial court denied. The appellate court reverses. Held: A Section 527.6 petition to enjoin civil harassment is subject to an anti-SLAPP motion to strike. However, an application for a temporary restraining order (TRO), issued pending a hearing on the petition for injunctive relief, is not subject to an anti-SLAPP motion. The request for a TRO does not qualify as a "cause of action" under the anti-SLAPP statute.

Plaintiff sued the Port for a variety of business-related causes of action, alleging that the Port had interfered with an exclusive negotiating agreement between plaintiff and others concerning development of bayfront property. The Port filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that the lawsuit arose from the Port's review of plans for the development. The trial court granted the motion. On appeal plaintiff argued that no issue concerning the development project was before the Port in any official process when the Port commented on the project. Even if that were true, the appellate court says, the project was nevertheless a matter of public interest and therefore the Port's comments were protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. Because the court also finds that plaintiff did not demonstrate a probability of prevailing on its claims, it affirms the grant of the motion.

Plaintiff Tutor-Saliba Corporation sued the City Attorney of San Francisco for allegedly defamatory statements he made in a speech before the San Francisco Chinese-American Democratic Club regarding a lawsuit he had filed against plaintiff.  The trial court granted defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion, concluding that the alleged defamatory statements were absolutely privileged under Civil Code section 47(a) ("official duty privilege"), as well as under Government Code sections 821.6 and 820.2 ("prosecutorial immunity" and "discretionary immunity," respectively). The appellate court affirmed.

(Case summary in preparation.)

The medical clinic sued Obando, a former employee, for numerous causes of action arising from alleged introduction of viruses in the clinic's computers and false representations about the clinic's business activities to health insurance companies. Defendant filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint, contending that the actions for defamation are based on statements he made as part of an investigation by the Food and Drug Administration. The trial court denied the motion on the grounds that the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply to the claims based on liability for an e-mail virus and, although the defamation claims did arise from protected speech, plaintiffs had established a probability of prevailing on those claims. The appellate court affirms.

Note! Opinion superseded by California Supreme Court's granting of petition for review on Feb. 6, 2006 (S140911).

Plaintiffs sued City of Salinas for allegedly engaging in partisan campaigning, based on the City's statements made in a newsletter to residents, and information and analyses posted on its website. The trial court granted the City's anti-SLAPP motion. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the anti-SLAPP statute applied because the action arose out of speech regarding a matter of public interest, and that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the City's statements expressly advocated an election outcome and thus could not prevail on the merits.

(Case summary in preparation.)

City refused to process plaintiffs' application for a "coastal development permit" because the city's right to do so was the subject of a lawsuit by the city against the California Coastal Commission. Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of mandate to require the city to process their application. The city moved to dismiss the petition as a SLAPP. The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion and refused to dismiss the petition. The appellate court affirms on the grounds that plaintiffs' petition arose from the city's refusal to process an application, not from the city's lawsuit against the Coastal Commission. Although the city could not claim the protection of the state's anti-SLAPP statute, it was not left defenseless in preserving its case against the Coastal Commission.

Two candidates for public office sought damages for libel and other torts based on statements posted on a public website. Defendant's anti-SLAPP motion was denied on the grounds that the allegedly libelous statements could be shown to have exceeded privileges afforded under state law and the U.S. Constitution. The appellate court reverses. According to the court, plaintiffs' claims fell squarely within the protection of the anti-SLAPP statute, requiring plaintiffs to show they could prevail on the merits, and plaintiffs failed to carry this burden.

Walker, a California Highway Patrolman, arrested Kiousis for suspected drunk driving. After pleading guilty, Kiousis filed a citizen complaint against Walker with the CHP, alleging conduct inappropriate for an officer. The CHP determined the complaint was without merit, and Walker then sued Kiousis for defamation. Civil Code § 47 generally creates an absolute privilege for statements made in the course of an official proceeding. However, § 47.5 creates an exception, allowing a peace officer to bring a defamation action against an individual who knowingly and maliciously files a false complaint about the office. Kiousis moved to dismiss Walker's suit, arguing that Civil Code § 47.5 was unconstitutional and therefore his complaint to the CHP was protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court granted the motion to strike, but on the grounds that Walker had not demonstrated a probability of prevailing on his lawsuit, as required by the anti-SLAPP statute, because he had not shown he sustained any actual damage. The appellate court affirmed the granting of the motion to strike, but on the grounds that § 47.5 is unconstitutional because it impermissably regulates speech based on the content of the speech.

In a dispute over use of a vacant lot owned by Wang, Hartunian obtained a permanent restraining order against Wang. Hartunian summoned the police on several occasions to deal with alleged violations of the order, and on one occasion effected a citizen's arrest of Wang. Wang sued Hartunian alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and abuse of process among other causes of action. Hartunian's special motion to strike the complaint as a SLAPP was granted by the trial court, which concluded that Wang was not likely to prevail on his claims. The appellate court reverses, holding that a citizen's arrest is not a protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute.

(Case summary in preparation.)

Plaintiffs sued defendants for malicious prosecution.  The trial court granted defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion and the court of appeal affirmed.  On remand, the trial court awarded attorney fees for the work on appeal as well as for defendants’ challenge to plaintiffs’ undertaking to stay enforcement of the judgment.  Plaintiffs appealed the award of attorney fees for the undertaking.  The appellate court affirmed, finding that not permitting attorney fees for such efforts would be inconsistent with the Legislature’s intent to encourage continued participation in free speech and petition activities.   

Weinberg sued Feisel for defamation, alleging that Feisel told others that Weinberg had stolen a valuable collector's item. Feisel moved to strike the complaint as a SLAPP, contending that his statements accused plaintiff of criminal activity and that criminal activity is always a matter of public interest. The trial court denied the motion, noting that Feisel never reported his suspicions to law enforcement officials and offered no evidence that he intended to file civil charges against plaintiff. The appellate court affirms. The court concludes that nothing in the record supports even an arguable suggestion that Feisel's statements constituted speech protected by the First Amendment and therefore plaintiff's causes of action were not subject to dismissal under the anti-SLAPP statute. "Defendant has failed to demonstrate that his dispute with plaintiff was anything other than a private dispute...."

Attorney Lieberman represented homeowners in an action against White for slander of title, and the trial court found White liable. An appellate court reversed on the grounds the action was not supported by substantial evidence. Subsequently White sued Lieberman for malicious prosecution of the slander action. The trial court sustained Lieberman's demurrer, but refused to consider Lieberman's anti-SLAPP motion on the grounds that it was moot in view of the successful demurrer. The appellate court concludes that the trial court erred in determining that Lieberman's motion was moot. Because a malicious prosecution action is within the provisions of the anti-SLAPP statute, and there is no possibility White can prevail, the only matter left for the trial court's consideration is the amount of attorney fees. (See Yu et al. v. Signet Bank/Virginia et al., where the same issue is decided similarly.)

Brokerage firm sued Wolk, alleging Wolk had made defamatory statements about its business integrity on her website, where Wolk publishes information for the general public about a special type of life insurance policy brokered by plaintiffs. Wolk moved to strike the claim for defamation as a SLAPP; the trial court granted the motion. The appellate court reverses the ruling. The court agrees that the anti-SLAPP statute applies in this case but concludes that plaintiffs showed the requisite probability of prevailing on their claim for defamation.

Several court reporters brought suit against an alliance of court reporters, claiming unfair business practice and interference with plaintiffs' existing contracts and prospective economic advantages. Defendants cross-complained for damages arising from a flyer circulated by the plaintiffs to raise money for litigation costs. The trial court's denial of a special motion to strike the cross-complaint is reversed.

Plaintiffs appealed an order granting an anti-SLAPP motion but dismissed the appeal before it was decided. Defendant moved for an award of attorney fees in connection with the appeal but the court denied recovery of fees. Defendant appealed the denial. The court of appeal reverses, holding that defendants in a SLAPP are entitled to an award of attorney fees incurred in connection with defending the anti-SLAPP motion on appeal even when plaintiffs voluntarily dismiss the appeal. Once the trial court has granted an anti-SLAPP motion, the judicial decision that the action was a SLAPP remains intact unless reversed by the court of appeal and thus the defendant remains the "prevailing party" for purposes of &sect425.16.

(Case summary in preparation.)

Yu filed a class action on behalf of California residents against two banks for abuse of process and unfair business practice after the banks filed debt-collection actions in Virginia, their home state. The trial court sustained the banks' demurrer to a third amended complaint but denied the banks' concurrent anti-SLAPP motion on the grounds the latter was moot in light of the successful demurrer. The banks appealed. Both parties appealed. On appeal Yu argued that, because the anti-SLAPP motion was filed a year after the original complaint, it was untimely under the anti-SLAPP statute. The appellate court holds that an amended complaint is a "complaint" under the anti-SLAPP statute (which requires that a special motion to strike be filed "within 60 days of the service of the complaint"), and, since the motion in this case was filed within 60 days of service of the third amended complaint, it was timely. In addition, the anti-SLAPP motion is no longer moot, the court concludes, in light of the court's reversal of the trial court's ruling on the demurrer. Nevertheless, the court affirms the trial court's denial of the anti-SLAPP motion but on the grounds that Yu's claims "have sufficient potential merit to withstand Banks' anti-SLAPP motion." The case is interesting because the filing of a collection action in a distant state in effect deprives customers of the opportunity to defend themselves. Nevertheless, the court filing is a protected First Amendment activity under the anti-SLAPP statute, so only a determination that there is a likelihood the plaintiffs might prevail preserves the complaint for abuse of process.

Note! This opinion was disapproved by the California Supreme Court in Briggs v. ECHO.

Zhao sued Wong for slander, alleging that Wong had falsely accused her of murdering his brother in a newspaper article about a coroner's investigation into the brother's mysterious death and a contest in probate court over the brother's will. The trial court granted a special motion to strike the complaint, saying that "if you make a comment about a judicial proceeding, that's an act in furtherance of a person's right of petition [or] free speech." The appellate court reverses, concluding that the brother's death, although newsworthy, did not rise to the level of a public issue protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.