- Adams v. Superior Court
- California Court of Appeal, 6th District, 1992 (2 Cal.App.4th 521, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 49)
Lawyers who represented plaintiff's opponents in a civil suit
intervened in two criminal cases in which the plaintiff was attempting
to have felony convictions reduced to misdemeanors or expunged.
Plaintiff sued the lawyers for abuse of process. Defendants relied on
Civil Code section 47, which protects publications made in any judicial
proceeding. The court holds that, even if the lawyers lacked standing
to intervene in the criminal cases, their action is privileged because
there was a reasonable connection between their action (motions for
reconsideration based on evidence of fraudulent behavior) and the
legitimate objectives of the proceedings in which they took action.
- Aronson v. Kinsella
- California Court of Appeal, 4th District, 1997 (58 Cal.App.4th 254, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 305)
- The court reconfirms that immunity from civil liability for
prelitigation statements is absolute. The requirement that a
prelitigation statement be made in connection with proposed litigation
that is "contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration"
(Civil Code sec. 47(b)) is not a test for malice, and the privilege
cannot be defeated by proof of malice. In this case plaintiff alleged
that a demand letter written by defendant's counsel contained libelous
statements. The court affirms summary judgment for the defendant.
- City of Long Beach v. Bozek
- California Supreme Court, 1982 (31 Cal.3d 527, 183
Cal.Rptr. 86, 645 P.2d 137; judgment vacated and cause remanded on
issue of independent state grounds (1983) 459 U.S. 1095, 103 S.Ct. 712,
74 L.Ed.2d 943; aff'd on state constitutional grounds (1983) 33 Cal.3d
727, 190 Cal.Rptr. 918, 661 P.2d 1072)
- Government may not respond to an unsuccessful lawsuit by a
citizen with an action for malicious prosecution because such an action
would unduly chill the citizen's constitutional right to seek redress
of grievances.
- Gritchen v. Collier
- U.S. Dist. Court, Central Dist. of California, 1999 (73 F.Supp.2d 1148)
- Collier, a police officer, issued a citation to Gritchen, who in
turn filed a complaint over Collier's conduct with his superiors.
Collier then threatened to sue Gritchen for defamation. Gritchen filed
suit in U.S. district court seeking declaratory relief, specifically,
that California Civil Code § 47.5, which permits a police officer
to sue a complainant for defamation, is unconstitutional. The district
court held that it is. (The opinion includes a valuable summary of
privileges for citizen complaints against police officers in all
states. See appellate court decision in this case, below; see also Haddad v. Wall below.)
- Gritchen v. Collier
- U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 2001 (254 F.3d 807)
- The court reversed the judgment of the district court on
procedural grounds, without deciding the constitutionality of
California Civil Code § 47.5.
- Haddad v. Wall
- U.S. Dist. Court for Central Dist. California, Eastern Div., 2000 (107 F.Supp.2d 1230)
- California Civil Code section 47.5 authorizes a defamation suit
by a peace officer for false statements about the officer's conduct in
citizen complaints made to the officer's agency. The court declared
this statute unconstitutional on its face. (See also Gritchen v. Collier, U.S. District Ct., 1999, above.)
- Leonardini v. Shell Oil Co.
- California Court of Appeal, 3rd District, 1989 (216 Cal. App.3d 547, 264 Cal.Rptr. 883)
- Leonardini, an attorney for a pipe trade council, sued Shell for
malicious prosecution after Shell lost a suit against Leonardini in
which Shell, contending trade libel, sought to enjoin publication of a
report concerning the safety of plastic pipes for domestic water use.
The court holds that the prior action was not legally tenable, and
therefore is a proper basis for malicious prosecution, because the
First Amendment prohibits a court from enjoining dissemination of
documents that form part of a public debate on a matter of health and
safety.
- Lucas v. Swanson & Dowdall
- California Court of Appeal, 4th District, 1997
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Note! Publication decertified by California Supreme Court June 18, 1997.
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- Mobile home park owner sued a rent control activist for libel
following a bitter political battle to establish rent control in
mobilehome parks. After the park owner voluntarily dismissed the suit,
the activist filed a "slapp-back" for malicious prosecution. Held:
because the conduct complained of in the park owner's suit was an
exercise of rights under the petition clause of the federal and state
constitutions, the accusations in the park owner's suit could not
support tort liability unless actual malice was shown, and the park
owner made no attempt to prove malice. Thus the activist's action for
malicious prosecution is allowed to proceed.
- Maple Properties v. Harris
- California Court of Appeal, 2nd District, 1984 (158 Cal.App.3d 997, 205 Cal.Rptr. 532)
- Real estate developer sued citizens who had opposed a development
project, alleging defamation, civil rights violations, and interference
with prospective economic advantage. The appellate court affirmed the
trial court's sustaining of a demurrer to complaints of libel and
sanctioned the developer-appellant for a frivolous appeal because of an
unambiguous directive from the Supreme Court to dismiss the causes of
action. (See Okun v. Superior Court.)
- Nguyen v. Proton Technology Corp.
- California Court of Appeal, 1st District, 1999 (69 Cal.App.4th 140, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 392)
Defendant Proton was concerned with raiding of its employees and
customers by a competitor (Excelsior). In a letter to Excelsior from
Proton's lawyer threatening a lawsuit unless the raiding ceased,
comments were made about Nguyen, a former Proton employee hired by
Excelsior. These comments included erroneous information about criminal
convictions Nguyen. Subsequently, Proton's lawyer communicated with
Nguyen's probation officer, expressing concern that Nguyen had engaged
in tortious business activities on behalf of Excelsior. Nguyen sued for
defamation. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant,
ruling that the comments were privileged by Civil Code section 47. The
appellate court reversed, holding that reasonable limits should and do
exist on the type and character of prelitigation statements protected
by the privilege.
- Okun v. Superior Court (Los Angeles Co.)
- California Supreme Court, 1981 (29 Cal.3d 442, 629 P.2d 1369, 175 Cal.Rptr. 157)
- The court directs the trial court to sustain demurrers to
complaints of libel arising from defendants' opposition to plaintiff's
real estate development. (See also Maple Properties v. Harris.)
- Pacific Gas & Electric v. Bear Stearns & Co.
- California Supreme Court, 1990 (50 Cal.3d 1118, 791 P.2d 587, 270 Cal.Rptr. 1)
- Public utility, which had a long-term contract for purchase and
sale of hydroelectric power with county agency, sued the agency's
consultant for interference with the contract after the consultant
advised the agency to sue to terminate the contract. The court affirms
the trial court's sustaining of defendant's demurrer.
- People v. Stanistreet
- California Supreme Court, 2002 (29 Cal.4th 497, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 633, 58 P.3d 465)
- Penal Code § 148.6 makes it a crime to knowingly make a
false accusation of misconduct against a peace officer. It is not a
crime to knowingly make such an accusation against any other government
official. The court holds that this circumstance does not render the
statute unconstitutional, reversing the decision of the Court of Appeal.
- Rothman v. Jackson
- California Court of Appeal, 2nd District, 1996 (49 Cal.App.4th 1134, 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 284)
Lawyer Rothman sought redress, through private negotiations,
from the pop singer Michael Jackson for torts allegedly committed
against a boy. A psychological evaluation of the boy fell into the
hands of the press, resulting in a firestorm of publicity. Defendants
immediately called a press conference to deny the allegations and
countercharged that Rothman and his clients made false accusations
against Jackson in order to extort money from him. Rothman sued Jackson
and his lawyers, alleging that defendants defamed him in the press
conference. The trial court sustained demurrers on the ground the
allegedly defamatory statements fell under the "litigation privilege"
(Civil Code sec. 47). The appellate court reversed, holding that the
challenged statements, although obviously made in anticipation of
litigation, did not have the "logical relation" to litigation required
by Civil Code section 47. The court rejected defendants' argument that
(1) lawyers for celebrities must litigate their cases in the press
because the public expects it and (2) therefore media attention becomes
part of the forum of litigation.
- Rubin v. Green
- California Supreme Court, 1993 (4 Cal.4th 1187, 847 P.2d 1044, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 828)
- Mobilehome park owner sued to enjoin lawyers from meeting with
park residents to discuss a proposed lawsuit against the owner for
alleged defects in the operation of the park. Civil Code section 47(b),
the "litigation privilege," immunizes from tort liability any
communication made in a judicial proceeding. The court holds that the
defendants' actions in meeting and discussing with park residents the
merits of a proposed lawsuit were communicative and clearly within the
scope of the privilege. "The core policy protecting access to the
courts underlying section 47(b) has led to the requirement that a
derivative tort action seeking redress for communications within the
privilege be delayed until the original suit is terminated in favor of
the derivative plaintiff."
- San Luis Obispo County v. Abalone Alliance
- California Court of Appeal, 2nd District, 1986 (178 Cal.App.3d 848, 223 Cal.Rptr. 846)
- County and private groups sued an environmental group and other
defendants to recover costs resulting from alleged civil disobedience
in protest of nuclear power plants. The appellate court affirms the
trial court's sustaining of a general demurrer.
- Sheldon Appell Co. v. Oliker
- California Supreme Court, 1989 (47 Cal.3d 863, 765 P.2d 498, 254 Cal.Rptr. 336)
- Apartment building buyer cross-complained of malicious
prosecution against seller's counsel. The court reverses the trial
court's entry of judgment on a jury verdict. Held: where there is no
dispute as to the facts upon which the attorney acted in filing the
prior action, the question of whether there was probable cause to
institute the action is a question of law to be decided on the basis of
whether the prior action was legally tenable.
- Shulman v. Group W Productions
- California Supreme Court, 1998 (18 Cal.App.4th 200, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 843)
- In this case of unwanted publicity of private facts (invasion of
privacy) the court addresses the balance between privacy and press
freedom. The elements of the tort of publication of private facts are
(1) public disclosure of (2) a private fact (3) which would be
offensive and objectionable to the reasonable person and (4) which is
not of legitimate public concern. A plurality opinion discusses at
length the "public interest" factor.
- Silberg v. Anderson
- California Supreme Court, 1990 (50 Cal.3d 205, 786 P.2d 365, 266 Cal.Rptr. 638)
- Following a divorce, a husband sued his former wife's attorney,
alleging that the attorney misrepresented the neutrality of a
psychologist retained to examine the couple and their children. The
court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the suit. Held: the
privilege accorded to statements made in the course of a judicial
proceeding applies to any publication required or permitted by law to
achieve the objectives of litigation, whether or not publication is
made to promote the interests of justice.
- Smith v. M.D. et al.
- California Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2003 (105 Cal.App.4th 1169, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 315, modified)
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Note! Opinion superseded by California Supreme Court's granting of petition for review (April 23, 2003). |
Smith sued M.D., a minor, for defamation, alleging that M.D.,
when six years old, falsely reported that Smith had sexually molested
her. M.D. filed a demurrer, arguing that her statements to police and
family were absolutely privileged under Civil Code § 47(b). The
trial court overruled the demurrer on the grounds that privileges in
the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (Penal Code & 11164 et
seq.) override any other privileges, including those in Civil Code
§ 47(b), and that M.D. was entitled to the qualified privilege
under the Act but not the absolute privilege under Civil Code §
47(b). The appellate court reverses. The court concludes that the Act
does not apply to minors who claim sexual abuse and therefore that such
minors are entitled to the absolute privilege under Civil Code §
47(b).
- Smith v. Silvey
- California Court of Appeal, 2nd District, 1983 (149 Cal.App.3d 400, 197 Cal.Rptr. 15)
- A resident of a mobilehome park was enjoined from initiating
complaints against park owner with public agencies and from contacting
any park residents. The appellate court reverses the injunction. Held:
the resident's exercise of his right of petition could not be
classified as harassing "course of conduct" within the meaning of a
harassment statute, and the prohibition against contacting other
residents was unconstitutionally overbroad.
- Wolfgram v. Wells Fargo Bank
- California Court of Appeal, 3rd District, 1997 (53 Cal.App.4th 43, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 694)
- Wolfgram was declared a "vexatious litigant" by the trial court,
after the court determined that Wolfgram had brought at least five
unsuccessful suits against various judges and officials. When Wolfgram
failed to post the required security, the court dismissed his claim.
Wolfgram appealed, arguing that the state statute on vexatious
litigation is an unconstitutional restraint on the right of petition.
The appellate court affirmed the dismissal. The court analogizes
vexatious suits to SLAPP suits and "sham" suits (under the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine), and concludes that the vexatious litigation
statute does not impermissibly "chill" the right to petition and does
not "penalize" the filing of colorable but unsuccessful suits.