Other California cases

[Updated February 22, 2005]

The following opinions are relevant to SLAPPs but do not involve the state's anti-SLAPP law (California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16). Many of these cases involve the privilege against liability for statements made in connection with legislative or judicial proceedings or proceedings authorized by law (Civil Code § 47).

Adams v. Superior Court

California Court of Appeal, 6th District, 1992 (2 Cal.App.4th 521, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 49)

Lawyers who represented plaintiff's opponents in a civil suit intervened in two criminal cases in which the plaintiff was attempting to have felony convictions reduced to misdemeanors or expunged. Plaintiff sued the lawyers for abuse of process. Defendants relied on Civil Code section 47, which protects publications made in any judicial proceeding. The court holds that, even if the lawyers lacked standing to intervene in the criminal cases, their action is privileged because there was a reasonable connection between their action (motions for reconsideration based on evidence of fraudulent behavior) and the legitimate objectives of the proceedings in which they took action.

Aronson v. Kinsella

California Court of Appeal, 4th District, 1997 (58 Cal.App.4th 254, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 305)

The court reconfirms that immunity from civil liability for prelitigation statements is absolute. The requirement that a prelitigation statement be made in connection with proposed litigation that is "contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration" (Civil Code sec. 47(b)) is not a test for malice, and the privilege cannot be defeated by proof of malice. In this case plaintiff alleged that a demand letter written by defendant's counsel contained libelous statements. The court affirms summary judgment for the defendant.

City of Long Beach v. Bozek

California Supreme Court, 1982 (31 Cal.3d 527, 183 Cal.Rptr. 86, 645 P.2d 137; judgment vacated and cause remanded on issue of independent state grounds (1983) 459 U.S. 1095, 103 S.Ct. 712, 74 L.Ed.2d 943; aff'd on state constitutional grounds (1983) 33 Cal.3d 727, 190 Cal.Rptr. 918, 661 P.2d 1072)

Government may not respond to an unsuccessful lawsuit by a citizen with an action for malicious prosecution because such an action would unduly chill the citizen's constitutional right to seek redress of grievances.

Gritchen v. Collier

U.S. Dist. Court, Central Dist. of California, 1999 (73 F.Supp.2d 1148)

Collier, a police officer, issued a citation to Gritchen, who in turn filed a complaint over Collier's conduct with his superiors. Collier then threatened to sue Gritchen for defamation. Gritchen filed suit in U.S. district court seeking declaratory relief, specifically, that California Civil Code § 47.5, which permits a police officer to sue a complainant for defamation, is unconstitutional. The district court held that it is. (The opinion includes a valuable summary of privileges for citizen complaints against police officers in all states. See appellate court decision in this case, below; see also Haddad v. Wall below.)

Gritchen v. Collier

U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 2001 (254 F.3d 807)

The court reversed the judgment of the district court on procedural grounds, without deciding the constitutionality of California Civil Code § 47.5.

Haddad v. Wall

U.S. Dist. Court for Central Dist. California, Eastern Div., 2000 (107 F.Supp.2d 1230)

California Civil Code section 47.5 authorizes a defamation suit by a peace officer for false statements about the officer's conduct in citizen complaints made to the officer's agency. The court declared this statute unconstitutional on its face. (See also Gritchen v. Collier, U.S. District Ct., 1999, above.)

Leonardini v. Shell Oil Co.

California Court of Appeal, 3rd District, 1989 (216 Cal. App.3d 547, 264 Cal.Rptr. 883)

Leonardini, an attorney for a pipe trade council, sued Shell for malicious prosecution after Shell lost a suit against Leonardini in which Shell, contending trade libel, sought to enjoin publication of a report concerning the safety of plastic pipes for domestic water use. The court holds that the prior action was not legally tenable, and therefore is a proper basis for malicious prosecution, because the First Amendment prohibits a court from enjoining dissemination of documents that form part of a public debate on a matter of health and safety.

Lucas v. Swanson & Dowdall

California Court of Appeal, 4th District, 1997

Note! Publication decertified by California Supreme Court June 18, 1997.

Mobile home park owner sued a rent control activist for libel following a bitter political battle to establish rent control in mobilehome parks. After the park owner voluntarily dismissed the suit, the activist filed a "slapp-back" for malicious prosecution. Held: because the conduct complained of in the park owner's suit was an exercise of rights under the petition clause of the federal and state constitutions, the accusations in the park owner's suit could not support tort liability unless actual malice was shown, and the park owner made no attempt to prove malice. Thus the activist's action for malicious prosecution is allowed to proceed.

Maple Properties v. Harris

California Court of Appeal, 2nd District, 1984 (158 Cal.App.3d 997, 205 Cal.Rptr. 532)

Real estate developer sued citizens who had opposed a development project, alleging defamation, civil rights violations, and interference with prospective economic advantage. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's sustaining of a demurrer to complaints of libel and sanctioned the developer-appellant for a frivolous appeal because of an unambiguous directive from the Supreme Court to dismiss the causes of action. (See Okun v. Superior Court.)

Nguyen v. Proton Technology Corp.

California Court of Appeal, 1st District, 1999 (69 Cal.App.4th 140, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 392)

Defendant Proton was concerned with raiding of its employees and customers by a competitor (Excelsior). In a letter to Excelsior from Proton's lawyer threatening a lawsuit unless the raiding ceased, comments were made about Nguyen, a former Proton employee hired by Excelsior. These comments included erroneous information about criminal convictions Nguyen. Subsequently, Proton's lawyer communicated with Nguyen's probation officer, expressing concern that Nguyen had engaged in tortious business activities on behalf of Excelsior. Nguyen sued for defamation. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant, ruling that the comments were privileged by Civil Code section 47. The appellate court reversed, holding that reasonable limits should and do exist on the type and character of prelitigation statements protected by the privilege.

Okun v. Superior Court (Los Angeles Co.)

California Supreme Court, 1981 (29 Cal.3d 442, 629 P.2d 1369, 175 Cal.Rptr. 157)

The court directs the trial court to sustain demurrers to complaints of libel arising from defendants' opposition to plaintiff's real estate development. (See also Maple Properties v. Harris.)

Pacific Gas & Electric v. Bear Stearns & Co.

California Supreme Court, 1990 (50 Cal.3d 1118, 791 P.2d 587, 270 Cal.Rptr. 1)

Public utility, which had a long-term contract for purchase and sale of hydroelectric power with county agency, sued the agency's consultant for interference with the contract after the consultant advised the agency to sue to terminate the contract. The court affirms the trial court's sustaining of defendant's demurrer.

People v. Stanistreet

California Supreme Court, 2002 (29 Cal.4th 497, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 633, 58 P.3d 465)

Penal Code § 148.6 makes it a crime to knowingly make a false accusation of misconduct against a peace officer. It is not a crime to knowingly make such an accusation against any other government official. The court holds that this circumstance does not render the statute unconstitutional, reversing the decision of the Court of Appeal.

Rothman v. Jackson

California Court of Appeal, 2nd District, 1996 (49 Cal.App.4th 1134, 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 284)

Lawyer Rothman sought redress, through private negotiations, from the pop singer Michael Jackson for torts allegedly committed against a boy. A psychological evaluation of the boy fell into the hands of the press, resulting in a firestorm of publicity. Defendants immediately called a press conference to deny the allegations and countercharged that Rothman and his clients made false accusations against Jackson in order to extort money from him. Rothman sued Jackson and his lawyers, alleging that defendants defamed him in the press conference. The trial court sustained demurrers on the ground the allegedly defamatory statements fell under the "litigation privilege" (Civil Code sec. 47). The appellate court reversed, holding that the challenged statements, although obviously made in anticipation of litigation, did not have the "logical relation" to litigation required by Civil Code section 47. The court rejected defendants' argument that (1) lawyers for celebrities must litigate their cases in the press because the public expects it and (2) therefore media attention becomes part of the forum of litigation.

Rubin v. Green

California Supreme Court, 1993 (4 Cal.4th 1187, 847 P.2d 1044, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 828)

Mobilehome park owner sued to enjoin lawyers from meeting with park residents to discuss a proposed lawsuit against the owner for alleged defects in the operation of the park. Civil Code section 47(b), the "litigation privilege," immunizes from tort liability any communication made in a judicial proceeding. The court holds that the defendants' actions in meeting and discussing with park residents the merits of a proposed lawsuit were communicative and clearly within the scope of the privilege. "The core policy protecting access to the courts underlying section 47(b) has led to the requirement that a derivative tort action seeking redress for communications within the privilege be delayed until the original suit is terminated in favor of the derivative plaintiff."

San Luis Obispo County v. Abalone Alliance

California Court of Appeal, 2nd District, 1986 (178 Cal.App.3d 848, 223 Cal.Rptr. 846)

County and private groups sued an environmental group and other defendants to recover costs resulting from alleged civil disobedience in protest of nuclear power plants. The appellate court affirms the trial court's sustaining of a general demurrer.

Sheldon Appell Co. v. Oliker

California Supreme Court, 1989 (47 Cal.3d 863, 765 P.2d 498, 254 Cal.Rptr. 336)

Apartment building buyer cross-complained of malicious prosecution against seller's counsel. The court reverses the trial court's entry of judgment on a jury verdict. Held: where there is no dispute as to the facts upon which the attorney acted in filing the prior action, the question of whether there was probable cause to institute the action is a question of law to be decided on the basis of whether the prior action was legally tenable.

Shulman v. Group W Productions

California Supreme Court, 1998 (18 Cal.App.4th 200, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 843)

In this case of unwanted publicity of private facts (invasion of privacy) the court addresses the balance between privacy and press freedom. The elements of the tort of publication of private facts are (1) public disclosure of (2) a private fact (3) which would be offensive and objectionable to the reasonable person and (4) which is not of legitimate public concern. A plurality opinion discusses at length the "public interest" factor.

Silberg v. Anderson

California Supreme Court, 1990 (50 Cal.3d 205, 786 P.2d 365, 266 Cal.Rptr. 638)

Following a divorce, a husband sued his former wife's attorney, alleging that the attorney misrepresented the neutrality of a psychologist retained to examine the couple and their children. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the suit. Held: the privilege accorded to statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding applies to any publication required or permitted by law to achieve the objectives of litigation, whether or not publication is made to promote the interests of justice.

Smith v. M.D. et al.

California Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2003 (105 Cal.App.4th 1169, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 315, modified)

Note! Opinion superseded by California Supreme Court's granting of petition for review (April 23, 2003).

Smith sued M.D., a minor, for defamation, alleging that M.D., when six years old, falsely reported that Smith had sexually molested her. M.D. filed a demurrer, arguing that her statements to police and family were absolutely privileged under Civil Code § 47(b). The trial court overruled the demurrer on the grounds that privileges in the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (Penal Code & 11164 et seq.) override any other privileges, including those in Civil Code § 47(b), and that M.D. was entitled to the qualified privilege under the Act but not the absolute privilege under Civil Code § 47(b). The appellate court reverses. The court concludes that the Act does not apply to minors who claim sexual abuse and therefore that such minors are entitled to the absolute privilege under Civil Code § 47(b).

Smith v. Silvey

California Court of Appeal, 2nd District, 1983 (149 Cal.App.3d 400, 197 Cal.Rptr. 15)

A resident of a mobilehome park was enjoined from initiating complaints against park owner with public agencies and from contacting any park residents. The appellate court reverses the injunction. Held: the resident's exercise of his right of petition could not be classified as harassing "course of conduct" within the meaning of a harassment statute, and the prohibition against contacting other residents was unconstitutionally overbroad.

Wolfgram v. Wells Fargo Bank

California Court of Appeal, 3rd District, 1997 (53 Cal.App.4th 43, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 694)

Wolfgram was declared a "vexatious litigant" by the trial court, after the court determined that Wolfgram had brought at least five unsuccessful suits against various judges and officials. When Wolfgram failed to post the required security, the court dismissed his claim. Wolfgram appealed, arguing that the state statute on vexatious litigation is an unconstitutional restraint on the right of petition. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal. The court analogizes vexatious suits to SLAPP suits and "sham" suits (under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine), and concludes that the vexatious litigation statute does not impermissibly "chill" the right to petition and does not "penalize" the filing of colorable but unsuccessful suits.