Court's opinion in Barrett v. Rosenthal (CA Supreme Court Case No. S122953) limits liability for Internet defamation. The decision holds that Internet users and providers are immune from civil liability for reposting third party content on the Internet.

The Briggses, landlords, sued a nonprofit organization that provides counseling, mediation, and referral services related to landlord-tenant disputes, alleging that the organization harassed and defamed him. The trial court granted defendant's special motion to strike the complaint. The appellate court reversed in a 2-1 decision, finding no "issue of public significance" in the defendant's conduct (see Briggs v. ECHO). The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal, holding that the anti-SLAPP statute is to be construed broadly and covers any lawsuit arising from the exercise of the right to petition the government, regardless of the issue involved.

Note! This case was reviewed together with Navellier et al. v. Sletten and Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc..

A city's action for declaratory relief respecting the constitutionality of its ordinance, filed in state court in response to a similar action filed by citizens in federal court, does not constitute a SLAPP and is not subject to CCP 425.16. (The decision affirms in part the Court of Appeal decision.)

Note! This case was reviewed together with Navellier et al. v. Sletten and City of Cotati v. Cashman et al..

The party moving to strike a complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute is not required to demonstrate that the action was brought with the intent to chill the exercise of constitutional speech or petition rights. (The decision affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeal.)

(Case summary in preparation.)

The court affirms the Court of Appeal decision.

The court affirms the Court of Appeal decision that a malicious prosecution action is not exempt from scrutiny under the state's anti-SLAPP law.

Ketchum sued his tenant Moses for allegedly filing false reports with government agencies about the condition of Ketchum's property. Moses prevailed on a special motion to strike Ketchum's complaint. Moses had a contingency fee contract with his attorney; if the anti-SLAPP motion failed, the attorney would receive no fee. The trial court awarded attorney's fees, as required by the anti-SLAPP statute, and included a fee enhancement to reflect the risk of nonpayment in a contingency contract. It later supplemented this award with additional fees and costs after Ketchum attempted to challenge the fee award. The Court of Appeal reversed. The Supreme Court affirms the judgement of the Court of Appeal but criticizes the rationale of the Court of Appeal. A successful movant of an anti-SLAPP motion is entitled not only to attorney fees incurred in the pursuit of the anti-SLAPP motion, but also to fees incurred in litigating the award of attorney fees. While attorney fees incurred in pursuit of an anti-SLAPP motion may be enhanced to reflect contingent risk, fees incurred after a successful motion may not be so enhanced because an award of fees is mandatory under the anti-SLAPP statute and therefore there is no risk of nonpayment.

(Case summary in preparation.)

Note! This case was reviewed together with Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. and City of Cotati v. Cashman et al..

Plaintiffs sued Sletten for a variety of causes, including breach of contract for filing counterclaims in an earlier lawsuit in federal court. Sletten moved to strike this cause of action as a SLAPP, claiming that his counterclaims were protected under the First Amendment's right of petition. The Court of Appeal (in an unpublished decision) concluded that Sletten's counterclaims were not a "valid exercise" of that right, as required by the anti-SLAPP statute, since he had earlier waived his right to sue Navellier in a "release of claims" as a condition of return to employment. The Supreme Court reverses, holding that Sletten had met his threshold burden of demonstrating that Navellier's action for breach of contract "is one arising from the type of speech and petitioning activity that is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute." (See follow-on decision in Navellier et al. v. Sletten, First District Court of Appeal.)

Rusheen sued Cohen for abuse of process, for allegedly filing false declarations on the issue of service, and conspiring to execute the resulting default judgment against Rusheen.  Cohen filed an anti-SLAPP motion, asserting that Cohen's conduct was privileged under Civil Code section 47(b) as communications in the course of a judicial proceeding.  The trial court agreed and granted the motion. The appellate court reversed on the grounds that executing on the improper default judgment was unprivileged, noncommunicative conduct.

The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the anti-SLAPP motion should have been granted.  It concluded that where the gravamen of the complaint is a privileged communication (i.e., allegedly perjured declarations of service) the privilege extends to necessarily related noncommunicative acts (i.e., act of levying).

(Case summary in preparation.)

(Case summary in preparation.)

Case summary in preparation.

"The perfecting of an appeal from the denial of a special motion to strike automatically stays all further trial court proceedings on the merits upon the causes of action affected by the motion." The court thus reverses the Court of Appeal decision.

Note! Opinion overruled by AB 1158 (2005), amending Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(b)(3). (See Senate Judiciary Committee analysis of AB 1158, Aug. 17, 2005, pp. 9-11.) and Cal. Code Civ. Proc § 425.16

The issue presented is whether, in an action for malicious prosecution, denial of an anti-SLAPP motion in the underlying action establishes that there was probable cause to support the action, thus precluding a suit for malicious prosecution. The court says it does when the denial is predicated on a finding that the action had potential merit. See the case summary at the Court of Appeal decision.

The tort of malicious prosecution includes continuing to prosecute a lawsuit discovered to lack probable cause. (This decision expands the tort, which previously was limited to commencing an action without probable cause.) Evidence to this effect is sufficient to defeat a special motion to strike a complaint for malicious prosecution. See Court of Appeal opinion.