Plaintiff sued Steinberg for business damages, alleging that Steinberg had colluded with plaintiff's former employee to promote legislative action adverse to plaintiff's business by facilitating meetings between the former employee and representatives of professional associations. The trial court granted Steinberg's anti-SLAPP motion to strike the entire complaint on the grounds that the cause of action was conduct "in furtherance of free speech or petition in connection with a public issue" and plaintiff had not demonstrated a probability of prevailing on its complaint, including counts of inducing breach contract and inducing breach of fiduciary duties. The appellate court affirms.

(Case summary in preparation.)

(Case summary in preparation.)

Plaintiff sought declaratory relief to prevent the LA Times from using a confidential internal report about conflicts of interest in the plaintiff organization. The trial court's denial of a special motion to strike the complaint is reversed. In the published portion of its opinion, the appellate court addresses the question of the timing of a request for attorney fees and costs.

Ampex sued an anonymous Internet poster for defamation and the poster responded with an anti-SLAPP motion. Once the poster was identified as Cargle, Ampex dismissed the suit and refiled the action in New York. The appellate court in an earlier opinion ruled that the trial court had jurisdiction to rule on the anti-SLAPP motion even after dismissal. In this opinion the court holds that Cargle was the prevailing party in the trial court and was therefore entitled to attorney fees under the anti-SLAPP statute.

This case arose from highly publicized and controversial litigation concerning the validity of "second-parent" adoptions. The parties were domestic partners. Sharon bore two children by artificial insemination during the relationship. Annette successfully petitioned the court to adopt the first child as a second parent. After the couple separated Annette filed a legal action to adopt the second child. Following that action, Annette sued Sharon for defamation arising from statements made by Sharon in a letter to an advocacy organization. The trial court's denial of a special motion to strike the complaint is reversed. The trial court ruled that the action arose from constitutionally protected speech but concluded that Annette had established a probability of prevailing on her claim. The appellate court disagrees on the grounds that Annette is a public figure by virtue of the public controversy surrounding the adoption proceedings and cannot prove the actual malice required of public figures alleging defamation.

(Case summary in preparation.)

Averill publicly criticized a plan by a charitable organization to convert a house in her neighborhood into a shelter for battered women. After she attempted to pursuade her employer not to contribute to the charity, the charity sued her for slander solely for her comments to her employer. The lower court's denial of Averill's special motion to strike the complaint is reversed. The appellate court holds that comments made in private, if made in connection with a public issue, are protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.

Plaintiff filed a complaint for malicious prosecution against Michael Larivee and the Quisenberry Law Firm. The trial court allowed Larivee to join in the Quisenberry Law Firm’s special motion to strike and granted the motion even though the hearing was held more than 30 days after service.  Affirming the lower court’s ruling, the appellate court found the hearing to be timely and held that joinder to a special motion to strike is effective as long as the joining defendant demonstrates that the action arises out of protected First Amendment activity.

Note! Opinion superseded by California Supreme Court granting of petition for review (April 14, 2004).

Rosenthal, an active proponent of "alternative medicine," posted another person's e-mail to two Internet newsgroups in which she was a frequent participant. The e-mail was critical of plaintiffs, physicians who actively combat the promotion and use of "alternative" or "nonstandard" health care practices and products. Plaintiffs sued Rosenthal for defamation. The trial court granted Rosenthal's anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint (see superior court decision) and the appellate court affirms. At issue is whether a provision in the Communications Decency Act -- "No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider." (47 U.S.C. 230) -- preempts all common law actions for defamation. If it does, as most courts in the U.S. believe it does, then plaintiffs cannot prevail on their defamations complaints and the suit must be dismissed as a SLAPP.

Plaintiff sued his insurer, alleging bad faith in handling his claim because of delay. The company filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint, arguing that, because the claim was eventually submitted to arbitration, the company's processing of the claim was an exercise of its right of petition under the First Amendment and therefore protected by both the anti-SLAPP statute and the "litigation privilege" (Civil Code § 47(b)). The trial court denied the motion and the appellate court affirms. According to the court, the cause of action lies in nonaction and delays, not in any specific statement or writing by the company, and none of this conduct involved the company's right of petition. Moreover, "the fact that a dispute exists that might ultimately lead to arbitration does not make every step in that dispute part of a right to petition."

Beilenson defeated Sybert in an election for U.S. Congress. After the election Sybert sued Beilenson, a campaign worker, a consulting firm, and a campaign committee, alleging that Beilenson distributed libelous campaign literature. The lower court's denial of Beilenson's special motion to strike the complaint is reversed. The appellate court holds that the anti-SLAPP statute protects statements by candidates for public office and their supporters.

Benasra sued lawyers who represented his business rival while still representing him, alleging breach of duty of loyalty. The trial court granted defendants' anti-SLAPP motion. The court reverses, holding that the court's earlier decision in Jespersen v. Zubiate-Beauchamp -- that a claim for legal malpratice is not subject to an anti-SLAPP motion to strike a complaint -- applies to a complaint alleging breach of attorney duty of loyalty.

While Benitez was being treated for infertility at NCWCMG's facility, she told her doctor she was a lesbian. Subsequently she encountered difficulties in receiving infertility treatment at NCWCMG. Benitez sued on a variety claims. Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion, on which the trial court did not rule. On appeal, Benitez argued that the motion is without merit and should be denied. The appellate court refuses to consider the issue on the grounds that there is no appealable order from the trial court.

Bergman sued attorney Drum for malicious prosecution of a case against her, and in response Drum filed an anti-SLAPP motion. The motion was denied and then affirmed in an earlier appeal, in which the appellate court concluded that Bergman had demonstrated a likelihood of prevailing on her claim. Thereafter the trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant. In this appeal the court holds that the doctrine of the law of the case precluded summary judgment for the defendant because summary judgement was inconsistent with the appellate court's previous ruling concerning the anti-SLAPP motion.

Plaintiffs sued Planned Parenthood under California's Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.), alleging that its websites contained "unlawful, unfair, confusing, and misleading statements" concerning abortion, and seeking injunctive relief. Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion, which was granted by the trial court after plaintiffs were unable to show a reasonable probability of prevailing on their claims for injunctive relief. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that the state's anti-SLAPP statute is unconstitutional on its face. The appellate court rejects all of plaintiffs' arguments and affirms the order granting the anti-SLAPP motion.

(Case summary in preparation.)

Blackburn obtained an undivided one-half interest in property co-owned by Brady and his partner Lanser at public auction in partial satisfaction of a money judgment against Lanser. In this action for partition Blackburn also alleges fraud, that Brady and Lanser conspired to drive up the value of the land at auction. Brady filed a special motion to strike the complaint for fraud, arguing that his written bid and any oral statements made at the auction were made in connection with an official proceeding, i.e., Brady's lawsuit against Lanser, and thus was protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court denied the motion and the appellate court affirms. The court agrees with existing case law that the anti-SLAPP statute does not protect every act having any connection, however remote, with an official proceeding. In order for statements or writings to be protected by the statute they must be made in connection with "an issue under consideration or review" in the proceeding.

DIRECTV sent letters to thousands of people who purchased devices that can pirate DIRECTV's television signals, demanding that the recipients cease using the devices. Several recipients of these demand letters filed a complaint against DIRECTV, alleging that the mailing of the demand letters was an unfair business practice (Bus. & Prof.Code, § 17200). DIRECTV filed an anti-SLAPP motion, which the trial court granted. The appellate court affirms, holding that the provision of the state's anti-SLAPP statute that excludes public interest lawsuits does not apply to the plaintiff-purchasers' action, and DIRECTV is entitled to have the complaint stricken.

(Case summary in preparation.)

A deputy sheriff shot and killed a citizen during execution of a search warrant. Following an investigation by the district attorney, the deputy was exonerated. However, the DA's public report of the investigation questioned the veracity of the affidavit supporting the search warrant. The deputy sued the district attorney for slander. The trial court's denial of the district attorney's special motion to strike the complaint is reversed. Held: the state's anti-SLAPP statute applies to public employees who issue reports and comment on issues of public interest relating to their official duties. Moreover, public entities are "persons" for the purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute and thus entitled to recover attorney fees when they prevail on a special motion to strike a complaint.

The director of a hospital training center at the University of California at San Francisco sued a newspaper for defamation over a series of five published articles about allegations of malfeasance at the center. The trial court's granting of the newspaper's special motion to strike the complaint is upheld. The appellate court interprets both the anti-SLAPP statute and Civil Code section 47 (immunizing participants in "official proceedings or litigation" from liability for tort actions), concluding that a State Auditor's report on the training center, which was summarized in one of the newspaper's articles, qualified as an "official public proceeding" within the meaning of Civil Code section 47 and that the newspaper's articles were written "in connection with a public issue" within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute.

Brenton sued for product liability and other causes of tort action, alleging that she suffered a psychotic breakdown after using a Metabolife product. She also alleged that Metabolife's false advertising and misbranding of the product violated the state's unfair business practices statute (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200). Metabolife moved to strike the entire complaint as a SLAPP, arguing that Brenton's complaint targeted protected commercial speech. The trial court denied the motion and the appellate court affirms. According to the court, the specific issue in this case is a recurring one: whether a claim against a manufacturer for physical injury, allegedly caused by use of its product, is subject to the anti-SLAPP statute merely because the manufacturer also engaged in commercial speech to market the product. The court rejects Metabolife's argument that its labeling and advertising of the product are protected by the anti-SLAPP statute because they constitute, in the statute's terms, written statements made in a place open to the public in connection with an issue of public interest. In addition, the court holds that the newly enacted Code of Civil Procedure § 425.17 (effective Jan. 1, 2004) expressly removes Brenton's complaint for unfair business practices from the anti-SLAPP statute's protection. (Section 425.17 provides that the anti-SLAPP motion to strike a complaint cannot be applied to "any cause of action brought against a person primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or services, ... arising from any statement or conduct by that person," as long as certain conditions are met.) The court rejects Metabolife's argument that § 425.17 is unconstitutional because it cannot withstand the strict scrutiny standard articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Publ. Serv. Comm'n (1980). (See also Martinez v. Metabolife Int., Inc., 4th District Court of Appeal (2003); Scott v. Metabolife Int., Inc., 3rd District Court of Appeal (2004).)

Note! Opinion superseded by California Supreme Court review. See Supreme Court opinion (Jan. 21, 1999).

Note! This opinion, which followed remand from the California Supreme Court, is not certified for official publication.

74 affiliated media companies sued defendant bond holders and their related entities for breach of contract and interference with economic relations, alleging defendants caused the default of and liquidation of plaintiffs’ entities by breaching confidentiality agreements and interfering with pending contracts.  Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion, which the trial court granted.   The appellate court reversed, concluding plaintiffs' claims arose out of commercial speech and conduct and therefore fell under the CCP  § 425.17 exemption to the anti-SLAPP statute.  Judge Bosk dissented.

(Case summary in preparation.)

(Case summary in preparation.)

(Case summary in preparation.)

Plaintiff podiatrist sued baseball player, reporters, and newspaper for defamation arising from statements in a newspaper article.  Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motions were granted; plaintiff appealed.  The appellate court affirmed, concluding that stating facts and opinions about plaintiff was plainly "conduct in furtherance of the exercise of ... [defendants'] constitutional right[s] of free speech" within the meaning of subdivision (e)(4); and since the statements served as a warning against plaintiff's method of self-promotion, and were provided along with other information to assist patients in choosing doctors, the statements involved a matter of public concern.  Furthermore, because plaintiff could not prove falsity, and because some of the newspaper’s statements were privileged, he did not demonstrate a probability of prevailing on his claims.

(Case summary in preparation.)

(Case summary in preparation.)

(Case summary in preparation.)

Mendoza sued an insurance company and its agents, Richard and Ina Chavez, asserting numerous contract and tort claims. All claims but one were dismissed. Subsequently the Chavezes sued Mendoza for malicious prosecution. Mendoza moved to strike the complaint as a SLAPP. The trial court ruled that a malicious prosecution complaint was not subject to the state's anti-SLAPP statute. The appellate court reversed the ruling, holding that a malicious prosecution complaint is subject to a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute. However, the court also concluded that the Chavezes had demonstrated a probability of prevailing on their complaint and therefore affirmed the trial court's denial of Mendoza's special motion to strike the complaint.

(Case summary in preparation.)

The Church of Scientology filed a lawsuit seeking to vacate a multimillion dollar judgment against it. This was part of extensive and drawn-out litigation (lasting 15 years) by Scientology against Wollersheim. The lower court's granting of Wollersheim's special motion to strike the complaint is affirmed, with the appellate court holding that the anti-SLAPP statute applies to causes of action arising from any act in furtherance of the right of petition, such as Wollersheim's original successful lawsuit, regardless of the subject matter.

Note! See State Supreme Court decision (Aug. 29, 2002) affirming in part the Court of Appeal decision.

Mobile home park owners challenged a Cotati "rent stabilization" ordinance in federal court, claiming the ordinance was an uncompensated regulatory taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. In turn, the city filed an action in state court for declaratory relief regarding the ordinance's validity. The state trial court granted the park owners' motion to strike the suit under the anti-SLAPP statute. The city appealed. Held: the trial court erred in shifting the burden to the city to prove it was likely to prevail on the merits and in granting the motion to strike. The city's suit did not, according to the court, have the effect of chilling the owners' right to petition for grievances; rather it sought a judicial determination of the very question of constitutionality prayed by them. The park owners failed to make a prima facie showing that the city's lawsuit arose from the exercise of the park owners' First Amendment rights, as required by CCP 425.16. The city, in responding to the park owners' motion to strike, made a prima facie showing that the ordinance furthered a legitimate and substantial public interest. Thus, the complaint was not subject to CCP 425.16. Contrary to the trial court's holding, the litigation privilege did not apply, as the state suit sought adjudication of the same controversy as the federal suit.

City filed a civil complaint against CCNE, alleging violations of the municipal code concerning campaign contributions. The trial court granted defendants' anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint, holding that the "prosecutorial exemption" in the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply to the complaint and the city had not demonstrated that it was likely to prevail on the complaint. The appellate court reverses on the grounds that the prosecutorial exemption -- "enforcement actions brought in the name of the people of the State of California" -- applies to civil actions by cities enforcing municipal law. According to the court, the legislative history of the statute indicates a broader intent behind the exemption than is evident from the specific wording. (See also People v. Health Laboratories of North America, Inc., 1st District Court of Appeal, and People ex rel. Lockyer v. Brar, 4th District Court of Appeal.)

The City of Los Angeles, on behalf of two of its employees, filed petitions seeking workplace violence protective orders under CCP § 527.8 against animal rights activists.  Defendants filed anti-SLAPP motions which the trial court denied, holding that the petitions were exempt as public entity enforcement actions under § 425.16(d).

The Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the exemption did not apply because the City filed the petitions as “employer” and not in its capacity as “public prosecutor;” the petitions arose from protected free speech activity; and the City failed to demonstrate a probability it would prevail on its claims because (1) the protective orders under § 527.8 can only be brought against natural persons (not ADL), and (2) the City presented no evidence that individual defendant Ferdin conveyed a credible threat of violence in the workplace.

(Case summary in progress.)

The City and the partnership that owns the San Diego Padres baseball team filed preemptive suits against proponents of a ballot initiative that would have made certain negative findings concerning an earlier city ordinance that authorized funds for construction of a downtown ballpark. Plaintiffs argued that the initiative was invalid and should not be placed on the ballot even if adequate signatures were obtained because the initiative sought to enact measures that were beyond the power of hte voters to adopt. Defendants filed a special motion to strike. The trial court granted summary judgment and ruled that in consequence the SLAPP motion was moot. The appellate court affirms. "Where . . . declaratory relief actions present purely legal questions about the validity of the subject matter of the lawsuits, . . . the SLAPP issue of whether the plaintiffs are more probably than not going to prevail in their actions may appropriately be determined by the use of related summary judgment proceedings."

Several lawsuits were brought concerning enforcement of initiatives approved by voters in Santa Monica and Pasadena. The initiatives sought to prevent city officials from receiving certain advantages from persons or entities who benefited from decisions made by those officials. Pasadena officials refused to certify the initiative on the grounds that they believed it was unconstitutional. A Pasadena resident filed a petition for a writ of mandate to require the city to certify the initiative; the initiative's sponsor was granted leave to intervene. The city filed a cross-complaint against the sponsor seeking a judicial declaration that the city had no duty to certify the initiative under the law. The sponsor filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the cross-complaint, which the trial court denied. The appellate court reverses on the grounds that the cause of action in the cross-complaint arose from protected First Amendment activity and the city was not able to demonstrate the required probability of succeeding on the cross-complaint.

(Case summary in preparation.)

Note! Opinion superseded by California Supreme Court's granting of petition for review (June 21, 2006).

Plaintiffs filed suit against Sierra Club, alleging improper distribution of information during an election to the Club’s board of directors.  The trial court granted Sierra Club’s anti-SLAPP motion.
The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part.  It reversed as to three causes of action which it found were exempt under § 425.17(b) as a public interest action.  It also found that one cause of action was not exempt under § 425.17(b) because the claim “seeks relief pertaining specifically to [two named directors] ... [and] the gravamen of a cause of action seeking relief of such a personal kind does not satisfy the public interest criterion of the exemption of § 425.17.”  The court found that the claim arose from acts protected by the First Amendment in connection with a public issue, and that the uncontested summary judgment in favor of defendant conclusively established that plaintiff had no probability of prevailing.

The Securities and Exchange Commission filed a complaint against Colt for "an illegal scheme to manipulate the price of four stocks." Colt responded to the SEC action by stipulating to a consent decree. After Freedom Communications published stories about the SEC allegations, Colt sued for defamation and other damages. The trial court granted defendant's anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint, and the appellate court affirms. The court concluded that, because defendant is immune from liability for the articles under Civil Code section 47 and plaintiff had not offered credible evidence of actual malice, plaintiff had not established a probability of prevailing on the complaint as required by the anti-SLAPP statute.

The neighbors of an apartment complex filed nuisance actions against the owners of the complex after unsuccessful attempts to abate alleged criminal activity and harassment by residents of the complex. In retaliation, the owners of the complex sued the neighbors for trade libel, defamation, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. When the neighbor-defendants filed a special motion to strike the complaint, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their complaint. The Court of Appeal found that the neighbors were targets of a SLAPP and that SLAPP targets are entitled to an award of attorney fees even if the SLAPP filer withdraws the complaint. "We do not believe," the court said, "the policies behind the SLAPP statute call for any different result."

Commonwealth Energy gave Investor Data a list of Commonwealth's shareholders. After Investor Data used the list to market its services to the shareholders, Commonwealth sued for a variety of business-related causes of action. Investor Data filed an anti-SLAPP motion, denied by the trial court. The appellate court affirms. The court points out that, because the speech alleged to be the cause of action (Investor Data's pitch to Commonwealth's investors) did not occur within an official proceeding, the decision whether Investor Data's statements are protected by the anti-SLAPP statute depends entirely on whether the statements were made in connection with a public issue (following the standard announced by the California Supreme Court in Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope and Opportunity). The court holds that a sales pitch for a commercial service does not qualify as a public issue for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute. (See the earlier case, Rivero v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, 1st District Court of Appeals.)

After a failed attempt at merger between Computerxpress and a business owned by defendants, defendants posted statements about Computerxpress on the internet and filed a complaint against Computerxpress with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Computerxpress sued, alleging in nine causes of action that defendants had conspired to damage its reputation and cause it economic harm. The trial court denied defendants' motion to strike the entire complaint on the grounds that none of the causes of action fell under the anti-SLAPP statute. The appellate court noted that the nine causes of action were based on three distinct sets of facts: (1) statements made in private business transactions, (2) the internet postings, and (3) the SEC complaint. The court concluded that statements made in the internet postings and SEC complaint fell under the anti-SLAPP statute, whereas the statements made in private business transactions did not. Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether plaintiff can demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the causes of action subject to the anti-SLAPP statute. In addition, the court ruled that defendants should be considered the prevailing party on the SLAPP motion, notwithstanding their partial success, and thus are entitled to attorney fees and costs incurred by the motion.

A candidate for public office sued his rival, alleging defamation in the rival's campaign statements. The appellate court upholds the trial court's granting of a special motion to strike the complaint. Plaintiff was a public figure and thus required to prove malice to prevail on a claim of defamation; he failed to demonstrate to the court's satisfaction a probability of prevailing on his claim, as required to defeat the special motion.

Consumer and consumer advocate sued a manufacturer of herbal supplements, alleging false advertising and other causes of action for the company's claim that its herbal supplement enlarged women's breasts. The appellate court affirms the trial court's denial of the company's special motion to strike the complaint. Defendant had not shown that its commercial speech was protected by the state's anti-SLAPP statute and in any event plaintiffs had demonstrated a probability of prevailing on their claims.

(Case summary in preparation.)