Court of Appeal, 1st District, 1995 (on appeal from San Francisco Co. Superior Court)
37 Cal.App.4th 855, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 46
A university offering a Ph.D. in "sensuality" sued a newspaper
for libel for a series of articles on the university in relation to
hearings by the county board of supervisors on whether the university
was violating local health, land use, and other government regulations,
and a suit by the county to enjoin alleged violations. The lower
court's granting of a special motion to strike the complaint is
affirmed.
Lafayette Morehouse v. Chronicle Publishing ("Morehouse II")
Court of Appeal, 1st District, 1995 (on appeal from San Francisco Co. Superior Court)
39 Cal.App.4th 1379, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 542
A defendant who prevails on a special motion to strike a
complaint is entitled to recover attorney fees and costs only for work
related to the motion, not for work unrelated to the motion. [Note:
This opinion was issued before the 1997 amendment of Code of Civil Procedure section
425.16, requiring that the anti-SLAPP statute be construed broadly, and
before the Supreme Court decision in Briggs v. ECHO,
which held that courts, "wherever possible, should interpret the First
Amendment in a manner favorable to the exercise of freedom of speech,
not to its curtailment."]
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2001 (on appeal from Orange Co. Superior Court)
91 Cal.App.4th 832, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 582
Vietnamese-Americans demonstrated against the display of North
Vietnam's flag in a store window. One group focused attention on a city
councilman, Lam, who was perceived to be indifferent. Lam owned a
restaurant, where demonstrators gathered. After the restaurant's
landlord, Ngo, allowed the demonstrators to gather in the parking lot,
restaurant and patron property was intentionally damaged. Lam sued Ngo
and 1,500 "Doe" demonstrators for damages and obtained a TRO, later a
preliminary injunction, against the demonstrators. Ngo filed a motion
to strike the complaint against him pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute.
The trial court denied the motion on the grounds that Ngo had already
lost in the contest over the preliminary injunction and had not
presented anything "new." The appellate court reverses. Held: the
granting of the preliminary injunction did not have the effect of res
judicata with respect to the anti-SLAPP motion to strike. Moreover, Lam
could not be held personally liable for acts committed by others absent
evidence that he authorized, directed, or ratified specific tortious
acts, incited lawless action, or gave specific instructions to carry
out violent acts or threats, and no such evidence was presented to
counter the anti-SLAPP motion. Nevertheless, violent acts associated
with the protest are not protected by the First Amendment and do
support tort liability, and thus the case is remanded to allow the
plaintiff to substitute named individuals who can be shown to have
engaged in tortious acts.
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2005 (on appeal from Ventura Co. Superior Court)
135 Cal.App.4th 89, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 375
Plaintiff high school athletic coach filed a lawsuit for libel,
slander, and other causes of action for statements defendant parents
made in a letter to the school board, oral statements defendants made
to other parents, and oral statements made to the school board while
requesting that it reconsider its decision to retain the coach. The trial court granted defendants anti-SLAPP motion for the libel
cause of action, finding that the letter was written to prompt official
action and was privileged under Civil Code section 47(b). However
it denied the motion to strike the remaining causes of action.
The appellate court affirmed the granting of the motion to strike the libel claim, but reversed the trial court's denial as to the other claims, holding that defendants' oral comments to school officials, interested parties (other parents), and the school board were all privileged.
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2005 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
131 Cal.App.4th 1517, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 139
Leegin brought an action for fraud against Diaz, an employee,
alleging that Diaz had knowingly filed a fraudulent worker's
compensation claim. The trial court granted Diaz's special motion to
strike the complaint. The appellate court affirms on the grounds that
Leegin is not likely to prevail on its claim.
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2004 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
114 Cal.App.4th 1252, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 507
After the Levys constructed a backyard playhouse, a neighbor
complained to her city councillor, who inquired of planning department
officials whether the construction conformed to regulations. Eventually
a city employee notified the Levys that the playhouse was an unapproved
structure and had to be removed or modified. The Levys sued the city
and the councillor for violation of a city ordinance prohibiting
councillors from giving orders to any subordinate of the city manager.
Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion, which the trial court denied on
the grounds that the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply. The appellate
court reverses, holding that the city councillor's communication to the
planning department was advocacy protected by the First Amendment, not
an order, and therefore covered by the anti-SLAPP statute.
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2003 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
110 Cal.App.4th 156, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 536
KCOP secretly recorded private consultations between Lieberman,
a physician, and reporters posing as patients. The recordings were
broadcast by KCOP to support allegations that Lieberman was improperly
prescribing controlled drugs. Lieberman sued KCOP for violation of
Penal Code section 632, which prohibits electronic eavesdropping on a
confidential communication without consent of all parties and provides
for monetary damages. The trial court denied KCOP's anti-SLAPP motion
to strike the complaint, finding that Lieberman had presented
sufficient evidence to demonstrate a violation of section 632. The trial
court affirms. The court concludes that the secret recording was an act
in furtherance of free speech inasmuch as the recording was
incorporated into a news report, and therefore plaintiff's cause of
action is subject to the anti-SLAPP statute. Nevertheless, plaintiff
has established a probability of prevailing on his complaint since (1)
a section 632 violation occurs the moment a confidential communication
is secretly recorded, regardless of whether it is subsequently
disclosed, and (2) there is no affirmative defense in the fact that the
secret recording was part of legitimate newsgathering.
Court of Appeal, 1st District, 2008 (on appeal from San Francisco Co. Superior Court)
163 Cal.App.4th 620, 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 707
(Case summary in preparation.)
Linsco/Private Ledger, Inc. v. Investors Arbitration Services, Inc.
Court of Appeal, 1st District, 1996 (on appeal from San Francisco Co. Superior Court)
50 Cal.App.4th 1633, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 613
| Note! This opinion was disapproved by the California Supreme Court in Briggs v. ECHO. |
Securities broker-dealers sought to enjoin the "unauthorized practice of law" by companies that represent individual investors in arbitration proceedings with brokers. The trial court granted defendant's anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint. The appellate court reverses on the grounds that disputes over individual investment losses are not matters of public concern and therefore the brokers' complaint was not subject to the anti-SLAPP statue.
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 1999 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
69 Cal.App.4th 745, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 807
A SLAPP plaintiff cannot avoid liability for defendant's
attorney's fees by dismissing its complaint prior to the hearing on
defendant's motion to strike the complaint. The court must still decide
the merits of the motion to strike in order to determine whether the
defendant is the prevailing party and therefore entitled to fees.
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 1995 (on appeal from Riverside Co. Superior Court)
37 Cal.App.4th 8, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 350
City, hoping to develop a shopping mall, sued a competing
developer for interference with contractual relations and prospective
economic advantage, and unfair competition, alleging that the developer
encouraged citizens to speak out at public meetings and file law suits
against the city's proposed mall. The trial court's denial of a special
motion to strike the complaint is reversed.
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2001 (on appeal from San Bernardino Co. Superior Court)
89 Cal.App.4th 623, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 504
An article in Sports Illustrated about adult coaches
who sexually molest youths included a photograph of a Little League
team, five players of which were molested by the manager. M.G. (and
others) appeared in the photo and sued for invasion of privacy. The
trial court's denial of a special motion to strike is affirmed. The
appellate court agreed that the anti-SLAPP statute applied to the
publication of the story. Time Warner argued that the photo was not
private and its publication met the test of newsworthiness. Plaintiffs
argued the photo was private and not newsworthy. The court concluded
that plaintiffs had demonstrated the likelihood of prevailing on the
merits of their claim, thus fulfilling their burden under the
anti-SLAPP statute.
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 1997 (on appeal from Ventura Co. Superior Court)
55 Cal.App.4th 669, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 222
An unsuccessful candidate for a labor union office sued the
successful candidate, alleging that defendant's campaign flyers were
defamatory. The trial court's granting of a special motion to strike
the complaint is affirmed. The "anti-SLAPP law applies to defamation
actions arising out of statements made in a union election."
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2005 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
135 Cal.App.4th 1485, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 875
In connection with an election, defendant Silna mailed a letter
to a number of Malibu residents supporting certain candidates.
Plaintiff Major filed a complaint for injunctive relief, alleging
violations of the Malibu Municipal Code. Silna filed an
anti-SLAPP motion which the trial court denied, finding that Major's
action fell within the section 425.17(b) exemption to the anti-SLAPP law.
The appellate court reversed, concluding that section 425.17 did not apply because subdivision (d)(2) excepts from this exemption "[a]ny action against a person ... based upon the ... dissemination ... or similar promotion of any ... political ... work." The court further held that Major could not show a probability of prevailing on the merits because he lacked standing to seek injunctive relief.
Mann, et al. v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc., et al. ("Mann I")
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2004 (on appeal from San Diego Co. Superior Court)
120 Cal.App.4th 90, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 215
The court holds that where a defendant has shown that a
substantial part of a cause of action constitutes speech or petitioning
activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, the plaintiff need only
show a probability of prevailing on any part of its claim. Once the
plaintiff makes this showing, the court need not determine whether the
plaintiff can substantiate all theories for that cause of action.
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2006 (on appeal from San Diego Co. Superior Court)
139 Cal.App.4th 328, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 607
Plaintiff challenged an attorney fees award, arguing that
defendants were not prevailing parties within the meaning of section
425.16, subdivision (c) because they were unsuccessful in striking
three of the four challenged causes of action. The appellate
court held that "a party who partially prevails on an anti-SLAPP
motion must generally be considered a prevailing party unless the
results of the motion were so insignificant that the party did not
achieve any practical benefit from bringing the motion," and
concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
determining defendants were prevailing parties on the anti-SLAPP
motion. However, it found that the lower court erred in failing
to reduce the fees to reflect that defendants were only partially
successful on the motion and ordered the fees reduced by 50%.
Maranatha Corrections, LLC v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
Court of Appeal, 3d District, 2008 (on appeal from Sacramento Co. Superior Court)
158 Cal.App.4th 1075, 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 614
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2006 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
137 Cal.App.4th 1262, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 867
Plaintiff brought a malicious prosecution action against
defendant and its counsel. Each defendant filed anti-SLAPP motions, which were denied on the basis that the plaintiff had
established a prima facie case of malicious prosecution. The appellate court reversed, finding that the plaintiff failed to
establish probable cause.
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2007 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
154 Cal.App.4th 154, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 488
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2003 (on appeal from San Diego Co. Superior Court)
113 Cal.App.4th 181, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 494
Martinez sued Metabolife for personal injury, alleging that the
injury was caused by ingestion one of Metabolife's products. Metabolife
filed a special motion to strike the complaint, arguing that the
complaint targeted commercial speech. The trial court denied the motion
and the appellate court affirms. This case was decided shortly before
Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17 became effective (Jan. 1, 2004).
Section 425.17 states that the anti-SLAPP motion cannot be applied to
any complaint against a person primarily engaged in the business of
selling or leasing goods or services where the cause of action arises
from advertising or other commercial speech. (See also Brenton v. Metabolife International, Inc., 4th District Court of Appeal (2004); Scott v. Metabolife International, Inc., 3d District Court of Appeal (2004).)
Court of Appeal, 3rd District, 1995 (on appeal from Nevada Co. Superior Court)
40 Cal.App.4th 539, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 880
An unsuccessful candidate for a local legislative office sued a
rival candidate and several contributors to an organization that
published a flyer accusing him of having "hundreds of dollars of unpaid
fines and citations" issued by the police, alleging libel and invasion
of privacy. The trial court's granting of defendant's special motion to
strike the complaint is affirmed.
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2002 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
99 Cal.App.4th 1179, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 794
Defendant law firm prosecuted a case for copyright infringement
against Mattel, maker of the Barbie doll. A federal district court
found for Mattel, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
finding of the trial court that the case for copyright infringement was
without factual foundation. Mattel then sued the law firm in state
court for malicious prosecution. The trial court denied a special
motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court
of appeal rules that an action for malicious prosecution qualifies for
treatment under the anti-SLAPP statute and affirms the trial court's
judgment that the plaintiff had demonstrated a probability of
prevailing on its action.
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2007 (on appeal from San Diego Co. Superior Court)
154 Cal.App.4th 97, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 467
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2004 (on appeal from Orange Co. Superior Court)
118 Cal.App.4th 1261, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 686
Metcalf sued U-Haul for unfair competition, alleging that it
consistently overstated the size of its rental trailers in
advertisements. U-Haul filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that the
complaint arose from its constitutionally protected right to commercial
speech. The trial court denied the motion. The appellate court affirms.
At issue on appeal is Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17, which
prevents defendants sued for false advertising from using the
anti-SLAPP motion and which became effective after the complaint in
this case was filed. The court rejects appellant's contentions that
section 425.17 is unconstitutionally discriminatory and that in any
event it cannot apply to a case in progress.
Court of Appeal, 1st District, 2008 (on appeal from San Francisco Co. Superior Court)
___ Cal.App.4th ____, 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 354
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2007 (on appeal from San Luis Obispo Co. Superior Court)
153 Cal.App.4th 499, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 129
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 3d District, 2007 (on appeal from Sierra Co. Superior Court)
150 Cal.App.4th 652, 58 Cal.Rptr.3d 671
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 1998 (on appeal from Santa Barbara Co. Superior Court)
65 Cal.App.4th 713, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 1
| Note! This opinion was disapproved by the California Supreme Court in Briggs v. ECHO. |
Mission Oaks applied to the county for a tract map for property development and agreed to pay for an environmental impact report (EIR). The draft EIR found that Mission Oaks' project would have numerous adverse and unmitigable consequences. Mission Oaks sued the county for breach of contract, alleging that it was a third-party beneficiary of the contract between the county and the consultant that prepared the EIR. The trial court's granting of a special motion to strike the complaint is upheld. "Here Mission Oaks is simply a disgruntled developer who does not like the findings prepared by the independent environmental consultants for the County and the public. Mission Oaks seeks to stifle the EIR prepared for the County and the public. [The] SLAPP [statute] is designed to preclude such attempts to silence those who speak out on matters of public interest before legislative bodies." The court distinguished this case from Ericsson GE Mobile Communications, Inc. v. C.S.I. Telecommunications Engineers.
Monterey Plaza Hotel v. Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Local 483
Court of Appeal, 6th District, 1999 (on appeal from Monterey Co. Superior Court)
69 Cal.App.4th 1057, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 10
Hotel sued union alleging defamatory statements by a union
official in a news report of a labor dispute at the hotel. The trial
court granted the union's special motion to strike the complaint. The
appellate court affirms, holding that plaintiff was unable to establish
a prima facie case of slander in its pleadings.
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2004 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
116 Cal.App.4th 182, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 154
Shaw, a probate lawyer, was hired to draft a trust termination
agreement. Moore, an heir of the trustee and a named successor trustee,
became disinherited as a result of the agreement and was unaware of the
trust until after it had been terminated. In subsequent complicated
litigation in probate proceedings, Moore petitioned the court to order
Shaw to pay damages for intentional and negligent participation in a
breach of trust. Shaw filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the
complaint, arguing that the causes of action for breach of trust arose
from her representation of beneficiaries of the trust. The trial court
denied the motion on the grounds that Shaw's drafting of the agreement
was not an "act in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free
speech." The appellate court affirms. In addition, the court ruled
that, because the anti-SLAPP motion was "totally devoid of merit,"
plaintiff is entitled to mandatory attorney fees under the anti-SLAPP
statute.
Moraga-Orinda Fire Protection District, et al. v. Weir, et al.
Court of Appeal, 1st District, 2004 (on appeal from Contra Costa Co. Superior Court)
115 Cal.App.4th 477, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 13
After a homeowners association submitted a rebuttal argument
against a tax increase for a voter information pamphlet, the fire
district sought a court order modifying or eliminating certain
statements in the association's argument. The association filed an
anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court denied the fire district's petition
and then denied the association's request for attorney fees and costs
under the anti-SLAPP statute on the grounds that, since the mandamus
proceeding had been resolved on the merits, the anti-SLAPP motion was
moot. On appeal the fire district contends that challenges to
statements in voter pamphlets are not subject to the anti-SLAPP statute
and that the statute must be "harmonized" with provisions in the
Elections Code authorizing legal challenges to false or inaccurate
voter pamphlets. The appellate court rules that the anti-SLAPP statute
is not inconsistent with the Elections Code, that it does apply in this
case, and the association is entitled to fees and costs.
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2004 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
122 Cal.App.4th 673, 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 149
The trial court denied defendants' anti-SLAPP motion on the
grounds that it was untimely. Defendants had argued that they could not
have filed the motion any sooner because they had a motion pending to
transfer the case to another district of the superior court. The
appellate court affirms.
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2007 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
149 Cal.App.4th 1424, 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 885
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2003 (on appeal from Orange Co. Superior Court)
109 Cal.App.4th 39, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 420
This class action against Twin Laboratories, which manufactures
and markets nutritional and dietary supplements, alleged violation of
various statutes because of false advertising of product ingredients.
Twin Labs moved to strike the complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP
statute, arguing that its advertising was commercial speech protected
by the First Amendment. The trial court agreed that defendant's
labeling and advertising were protected commercial speech but also
concluded that plaintiffs had established a probability of prevailing
on their claims, therefore defeating the motion. The appellate court
affirms the denial but on the grounds that a list of product
ingredients is not commercial speech protected by the anti-SLAPP
statute.
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2005 (on appeal from Orange Co. Superior Court)
134 Cal.App.4th 834, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 385
Plaintiff sued IHOP for fraud alleging that IHOP never intended
to keep its promise made in a stipulated judgment to consider offers to
purchase her franchise "without undue delay."; IHOP
appealed the trial court's denial of its anti-SLAPP motion. The appellate court reversed, finding that 1) the section 425.17
exemption did not apply because any promises or statements made by
defendant were to induce settlement of a lawsuit and were not made
during a commercial transaction; 2) the complaint arose from
defendant's statements in, or in connection with a judicial
proceeding; and 3) plaintiff did not prove a probability of prevailing
on her claim because the statements IHOP made during a stipulated
judgment were protected by the litigation privilege and she failed to
show causation.
Court of Appeal, 1st District, 2003 (on appeal from San Mateo Co. Superior Court)
106 Cal.App.4th 763, 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 201
Plaintiffs brought actions for fraud and breach of contract.
Defendant moved to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute,
the motion was denied, and the appellate court affirmed on the grounds
that the causes of action -- negotiation and execution of a release
agreement and pursuit of counterclaims in litigation -- were not
protected by the anti-SLAPP statute (unpublished opinion). The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the causes of action were protected by the
anti-SLAPP statute, and remanded the case to the court of appeal with
instructions to reconsider its decision in light of the Supreme Court's
opinion. (See Navellier, et al. v. Sletten,
California Supreme Court.) Specifically, the court was directed to
consider whether plaintiff had established a probability of prevailing
on its complaint. In this opinion the court holds that the plaintiffs
have not established a probability of prevailing on their claims and
thus reverses the trial court's denial of the anti-SLAPP motion.
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2008 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
160 Cal.App.4th 1255, 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 383
(Case summary in preparation.)
Northern California Carpenters Regional Council v. Warmington Hercules Associates
Court of Appeal, 1st District, 2004 (on appeal from Contra Costa Co. Superior Court)
124 Cal.App.4th 296, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 918
A carpenters' union and individuals sued building contractors
for failure to pay them prevailing wages under city's Redevelopment
Agency's policy, alleging unfair business practices. Defendants filed
an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that the lawsuit was retaliation for
their petition to a state agency for a determination that they were not
required to pay prevailing wages. The motion was denied by the court on
the grounds that the cause of action did not arise from filing a
petition with the state but from failure to pay prevailing wages. On
appeal plaintiffs argued that the court was required by Code of Civil
Procedure section 425.17 to affirm the trial court's denial. Section
425.17 was intended to curb abuse of the anti-SLAPP statute by
providing that the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to "any action
brought solely in the public interest or on behalf of the general
public." The appellate court affirms the trial court's ruling, holding
that the plaintiffs' complaint meets the conditions of section 425.17.
(See also Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine v. Tyson Foods, Inc.
Novartis Vaccines and Diagnostics, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty, USA, Inc.
Court of Appeal, 1st District, 2006 (on appeal from Alameda Co. Superior Court)
143 Cal.App.1st 1284, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 861
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2008 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
159 Cal.App.4th 1027, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 210
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 3d District, 2006 (on appeal from Sacrcamento Co. Superior Court)
135 Cal.App.4th 1501, 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 467
Plaintiff filed a complaint for damages against his former
employer, alleging he had been defamed during its investigation of
sexual harassment complaints against him. The trial court denied
defendant's anti-SLAPP motion. The appellate court
affirmed, holding that the anti-SLAPP law did not apply because a
sexual harassment investigation within a private company does not
constitute an official proceeding, and an investigation by a private
employer concerning a small group of people does not involve an issue
of public interest.
Court of Appeal, 3d District, 2005 (on appeal from Sacrcamento Co. Superior Court)
134 Cal.App.4th 278, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 684
Co-counsel sued each other in a dispute over fee sharing. Nine months after a second amended complaint was filed, defendant filed
an anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court found the anti-SLAPP motion
was untimely because it was filed more than 60 days after service of
the complaint. Harbison appealed. The appellate court
dismissed the appeal as frivolous and sanctioned Harbison.
Court of Appeal, 1st District, 2007 (on appeal from Marin Co. Superior Court)
151 Cal.App.4th 688, 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 29
(Case summary in preparation.)