Opinions in the California Courts of Appeal Concerning the Anti-SLAPP Statute (CCP § 425.16)
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2004 (modified) (on appeal from San Diego Co. Superior Court)
114 Cal.App.4th 495, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 584
The owners of the Padres baseball club filed claims for
malicious prosecution against attorney Henderson arising from a series
of lawsuits Henderson had filed challenging actions taken by the City
of San Diego, in collaboration with the Padres, to develop a new
baseball park. Henderson filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike all
claims. The trial court dismissed claims based on one of Henderson's
lawsuits (plaintiffs had conceded the claim was time-barred) and denied
the special motion to strike the claims based on other lawsuits filed
by Henderson. The appellate court reverses in part. The court holds
that no absolute privilege applies to Henderson's filing of the
lawsuits against the Padres (and thus distinguishes City of Long Beach v. Bozek,
California Supreme Court, 1982). The court concludes, however, that the
plaintiffs have not demonstrated the requisite lack of probable cause
in support of two of their three claims for malicious prosecution.
Court of Appeal, 6th District, 2008 (appeal from Santa Clara Co. Superior Court)
___Cal.App.6th____, ____Cal.Rptr.3d ____
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2008 (appeal from Orange Co. Superior Court)
163 Cal.App.4th 1342, 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 244
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 2nd District, 2002 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
95 Cal.App.4th 853, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 82
Former clients sued Paul, a securities broker, alleging fraud,
negligence, and violation of securities laws. Paul was completely
vindicated in an arbitration proceeding; in addition, the court awarded
sanctions against the plaintiffs for filing a "frivolous claim for
which there was no factual foundation." Paul then sued his former
clients and their lawyer, Friedman, for malicious prosecution and a
variety of other causes arising from Friedman's investigation of Paul
during the aribtration proceeding and disclosure of personal
information. Friedman filed a special motion to strike the complaint
pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, on the grounds that the
investigation and disclosure of information were related to "an issue
under consideration or review" in the arbitration proceeding. The trial
court granted Friedman's motion to strike all tort and contract claims
but refused to strike Paul's claim that Friedman has breached a
confidentiality agreement reached at the commencement of arbitration
for the earlier lawsuit. In a complex decision the appellate court
rules that Paul's tort and contract claims cannot be stricken under the
anti-SLAPP statute since Friedman had not met his burden of proof,
i.e., he had not made the required prima facie showing that Paul's claims arose from activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.
Court of Appeal, 2nd District, 2001 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
85 Cal.App.4th 1356, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 864
Paul was a candidate for city council. He sued defendants,
alleging that they interfered with his candidacy by contributing to an
opponent in a manner that violated the state's Political Reform Act.
Defendants filed a special motion to strike the allegation. They
effectively conceded the illegal nature of their method of campaign
contributions, but argued that their campaign money laundering was
nevertheless "in furtherance" of their First Amendment rights, and thus
was protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court granted the
motion. The appellate court reverses, holding that such illegal
activity is not a valid exercise of constitutional rights as
contemplated by the anti-SLAPP statute. (See also The Governor Gray Davis Committee v. American Taxpayers Alliance.)
Court of Appeal, 6th District, 2006 (review of Santa Clara Co. Superior Court)
139 Cal.App.4th 659, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 148
Lynch brought an anti-SLAPP motion to strike Paulus's action for
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and intentional interference
with contract. The court granted the motion and awarded Lynch
attorney fees and costs. Paulus appealed. The appellate
court affirmed, concluding that Paulus failed to make a prima facie
showing of lack of probable cause for his malicious prosecution
claim. The court further found that Paulus had made no
independent factual or legal arguments regarding the merits of his
other claims in the trial court, nor had he specifically addressed the
matter in his opening brief, and thus deemed Paulus to have abandoned
any challenge to the order striking those two claims.
Court of Appeal, 1st District, 2001 (on appeal from Napa Co. Superior Court)
87 Cal.App.4th 442, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 618
The district attorneys of two counties sued the manufacturer of
a weight-loss product, alleging that advertising claims violated
various state statutes. Defendant filed a special motion to strike,
arguing that the action was prosecuted to chill its exercise of free
speech. Defendant acknowledged that the anti-SLAPP statute expressly
does not apply to an enforcement action brought by a district attorney
(Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (d)), but challenged the constitutionality of
this exclusion. The trial court denied the motion and the appellate
court affirms, holding that the exclusion does not violate the "equal
protection" clause of either the U.S. or California constitutions.
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2004 (on appeal from Orange Co. Superior Court)
115 Cal.App.4th 1315, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 844
The state attorney general filed a complaint against Brar to
obtain an order to stop Brar from filing lawsuits under the state's
unfair competition law. Brar moved to strike the complaint pursuant to
the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court denied the motion. The court of
appeal dismisses the motion as friviolous inasmuch as the anti-SLAPP
statute, by its own provisions, does not apply to actions brought by
public prosecutors.
People ex rel. 20th Century Insurance Co. v. Building Permit Consultants, Inc.
Court of Appeal, 2nd District, 2000 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
86 Cal.App.4th 280, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 71
An insurance company sued a company that assisted individuals in
preparing estimates of damages from an earthquake. Plaintiff alleged
that defendants arranged with homeowners to artificially increase the
estimates on the condition they receive up to 50 percent of the
insurance payments. Defendants filed a special motion to strike,
arguing that the estimates were prepared in anticipation of litigation
and therefore were exercises in the right of petition. The trial court
denied the motion and the appellate court affirms. "At the time
defendants created and submitted their reports and claims, there was no
'issue under consideration' pending before any official proceedings."
Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP
Court of Appeal, 1st District, 2005 (on appeal from Alameda Co. Superior Court)
133 Cal.App.4th 658, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 31
This case arose from the collapse of a fraudulent investment
scheme. Plaintiffs — investors who lost millions and a
bankruptcy trustee representing entities that were used to perpetrate
the scheme — sued defendant law firm for conduct which allegedly
helped advance the fraudulent scheme. The trial court denied
defendant's anti-SLAPP motion. The appellate court reversed
in part, finding the motion should have been granted in part because
plaintiffs' claims were partially based on positions the firm took in
court, or in anticipation of litigation with the SEC, and some
plaintiffs did not establish a probability of prevailing. Specifically,
the court concluded the bankruptcy trustee's claims on behalf of one
entity were barred by the doctrine of unclean hands and the investors'
claims were barred by the statute of limitations.
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2002 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
101 Cal.App.4th 211, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 647
A landlord notified tenants to vacate their parking spaces for
construction. The tenants association encouraged tenants to send the
landlord a letter protesting that they could be forced to vacate their
parking spaces only after a "legal process." In the aftermath, two of
the landlord's locks were broken. The landlord sued the tenants
association and certain tenants for damages on a variety of claims.
Defendants filed a demurrer and notified the plaintiff of their
intention to file a special motion to strike the complaint pursuant to
the anti-SLAPP statute. On the eve of the deadline to file the
anti-SLAPP motion, the plaintiff dismissed all but two individual
defendants, and shortly thereafter filed an amended complaint. The
trial court dismissed the case under the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex
(the law does not concern itself with trifles) and thus did not conduct
a hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion. Defendants filed a motion for
attorney fees under the anti-SLAPP statute; the motion was denied on
the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction. Held on appeal: "the
trial court has jurisdiction to award attorney fees to a prevailing
defendant whose SLAPP motion was not heard solely because the matter
was dismissed before defendants obtained a ruling on the SLAPP motion."
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2003 (appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
107 Cal.App.4th 761, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 400
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2007 (appeal from Orange Co. Superior Court)
154 Cal.App.4th 347, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 504
(Case summary in preparation.)
Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine v. Tyson Foods, Inc.
Court of Appeal, 1st District, 2004 (on appeal from San Francisco Co. Superior Court)
119 Cal.App.4th 120, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 926
Plaintiff brought an action for unfair business practice under
Business & Professions Code § 17500, alleging that Tyson made
false and deceptive representations about its chicken products sold in
California. Tyson filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that the cause of
action arose from Tyson's exercise of its right of free speech "in
connection with a public issue". The trial court granted the motion on
the grounds that plaintiff failed to demonstrate a probability of
success on its claims. The appellate court reverses on the grounds that
Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17, enacted while the appeal was
pending, applies to the case. Section 425.17 provides that the
anti-SLAPP motion to strike a complaint cannot be applied to "any cause
of action brought against a person primarily engaged in the business of
selling or leasing goods or services, ... arising from any statement or
conduct by that person," as long as certain conditions are met. Moreover, section 425.17 contains a retroactivity clause that operated
as a repeal of the trial court's order. (See also Brenton v. Metabolife International, Inc.)
Court of Appeal, 1st District, 2003 (on appeal from San Mateo Co. Superior Court)
107 Cal.App.4th 345, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 46
Plaintiff filed an action for declaratory relief, asking the
court to apply to defendants an earlier injunction limiting
demonstrations outside its clinic. The trial court denied defendants'
anti-SLAPP motion on the grounds that defendants had waived protection
of the anti-SLAPP statute by stipulating that the present action could
be filed. The appellate court affirms the denial. Held: the question
whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies in this case became moot once
the trial court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment because
in denying summary judgment the trial court impliedly found that
plaintiff had demonstrated a probability of prevailing on its claim.
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2008 (appeal from San Diego Co. Superior Court)
166 Cal.App.4th 772, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 95
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2008 (appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
164 Cal.App.4th 1031, 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 822
(Case summary in preparation.)
Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Insurance Guarantee Association ("Premier Medical I")
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2006 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
136 Cal.App.4th, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 43
Defendants petitioned the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board
(WCAB) to determine whether plaintiff was improperly representing
treating physicians in WCAB proceedings. Plaintiff sued, alleging that
the defendants were engaged in anticompetitive activity. Arguing
that the complaint was based entirely on the defendants' constitutional
right to petition the WCAB, defendants filed a special motion to strike
the complaint. The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP
motion. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the
constitutional right to petition includes the basic act of seeking
administrative action.
Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Insurance Guarantee Association ("Premier Medical II")
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2008 (appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
163 Cal.App.4th 550, 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 695
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2005 (on appeal from San Diego Co. Superior Court)
135 Cal.App.4th 510, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 381
Ramona Unified School District (District) sued Neighborhood
Alliance for Safe Ramona Schools (Alliance) for abuse of process and
barratry stemming from Alliance's writ petition challenging
a District construction project. The trial court granted
Alliance's anti-SLAPP motion. The appellate court
affirmed. It held that the gravamen of the abuse of process claim
was actually for malicious prosecution, and was barred under City of
Long Beach v. Bozek, California Supreme Court, 1982, which held a government
entity may not institute a malicious prosecution proceeding against a
former plaintiff. To succeed on the barratry claim, plaintiffs
had to show the defendants "excited" at least three
groundless lawsuits, however defendants' amendments to their writ
petition did not constitute separate proceedings.
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2004 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
116 Cal.App.4th 135, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 333
Several individuals sued Sony Pictures under the state's unfair
competition statute, alleging that Sony falsely portrayed a person as a
film critic and attributed to him laudatory reviews of its films. The
studio filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint; the trial
court denied the motion on the grounds that advertisements for films,
as commercial speech, are not protected under the First Amendment. The
appellate court (in a split decision) affirms.
Rivero v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO
Court of Appeal, 1st District, 2003 (on appeal from Alameda Co. Superior Court)
105 Cal.App.4th 913, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 81
Rivero sued numerous individuals and entities, alleging
defamation and other claims arising from statements made by the union
as part of its contract negotiation campaign. Rivero, a supervising
janitor at a university, had been accused of theft, extortion, and
favoritism by employees he supervised. Although the charges were not
substantiated by an investigation, Rivero's position was terminated and
he was assigned work as a pot scrubber. During contract negotiations
with the university the union distributed flyers that claimed union
janitors had stood up to their "abusive supervisor" and caused his
firing. The union filed an anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court denied
the motion on the grounds that the statements made by the union during
contract negotiations do not fall under activity protected by the
state's anti-SLAPP statute. The appellate court affirms. Most of the
court's opinion focuses on the phrase "in connection with a public
issue" in the anti-SLAPP statute.
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2003 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
105 Cal.App.4th 604, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 546
Roberts was a candidate in an election for municipal court judge
in Los Angeles. The bar association evaluates all candidates in
contested elections for judgeships through its judicial evaluation
committee. A candidate may request disqualification of any member of
the committee who the candidate believes has a potential conflict of
interest. Roberts objected to seven members of the committee. The day
after the committee publicly issued an evaluation of Roberts as "not
qualified," Roberts sued the association for breach of contract and
fraud based on the allegation that one of the committee members who
should have been disqualified at her request was actually present
during committee deliberations. The association filed an anti-SLAPP
motion to strike the complaint; the trial court denied the motion on
the grounds that the suit, which sought damages in connection with the
evaluation process, was not a SLAPP. The appellate court reverses on
the grounds that the evaluation process is "inextricably intertwined
with and part and parcel of the evaluations," which are
constitutionally protected speech. Thus, the anti-SLAPP statute applies
as much to the evaluation process as to the evaluations themselves.
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 1995 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
36 Cal.App.4th 347, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 464
A city councilman, alleging libel, sued proponents of a campaign
to recall him. At issue was a mailer stating that the plaintiff had
been fined by the city for operating an illegal business out of his
home. The trial court's granting of a special motion to strike the
complaint is affirmed.
Court of Appeal, 3d District, 2006 (on appeal from Solano Co. Superior Court)
148 Cal.App.4th 1416, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 65
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2007 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
154 Cal.App.4th 28, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 348
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 3d District, 2001 (on appeal from Placer Co. Superior Court)
88 Cal.App.4th 260, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 674
Rosenaur launched a ballot initiative to permit commercial
development of land he owned. The measure lost after a bitterly fought
campaign. Rosenaur sued defendants, opponents of the measure, alleging
defamation. The trial court granted a special motion to strike the
allegation. The appellate court affirms, holding that the statements
alleged to be defamatory could not reasonably be interpreted as factual
and therefore plaintiff could not make out a prima facie case for
defamation. Rosenaur also appealed the award of attorney fees to
defendants, arguing that defendants are not entitled to recover
attorney fees because defense counsel agreed to a partial pro bono
fee. Held: neither the plain language of the anti-SLAPP statute nor the
policies underlying it justifies denying a prevailing defendant
attorney fees when representation is pro bono.
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2006 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
145 Cal.App.4th 188, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 484
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2008 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
160 Cal.App.4th 653, 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 87
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2005 (on appeal from Orange Co. Superior Court)
134 Cal.App.4th 1456, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 133
Ruiz alleged that two letters written by HVCA's attorney
defamed him. The trial court denied HVCA's anti-SLAPP motion on the
grounds that the letters were not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.
The appellate court reversed, holding that the two letters were
communications regarding an issue of public interest. The court
further found that Ruiz had not shown a probability of prevailing: he
failed to show the second letter was defamatory, or that either letter
had been published. However, the court remanded with directions
for the trial court to reconsider Ruiz's request for discovery only on
the issue of publication of the first letter and decide the anti-SLAPP
motion accordingly.
Court of Appeal, 1st District, 2008 (on appeal from San Mateo Co. Superior Court)
161 Cal.App.4th 1275, 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 873
(Case summary in preparation.)
San Ramon Valley Fire Protection District v. Contra Costa County Employees' Retirement Association
Court of Appeal, 1st District, 2004 (on appeal from Contra Costa Co. Superior Court)
125 Cal.App.4th 343, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 724
A complaint seeking judicial review of an action or decision by
a public entity is not subject to a special motion to strike under the
anti-SLAPP statute. The action is not itself an exercise of the public
entity's right of free speech or petition.
Santa Barbara County Coalition Against Automobile Subsidies v. Santa Barbara County Association of Governments
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 2008 (on appeal from Santa Barbara Co. Superior Court)
167 Cal.App.4th 1229, 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 714
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 2nd District, 2003 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
109 Cal.App.4th 1308, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 903
The Board filed this action for declaratory and injunctive
relief, alleging that state and local rent control law were violated by
defendants. At issue is whether, in light of facts presented to the
Board, defendants are entitled to charge market rate for rental of
certain units. The trial court granted defendants' anti-SLAPP motion to
strike the complaint. The appellate court reverses on the grounds that
the basis of the suit — defendants' filing of notices of their
intention to re-rent units at market rates — is not an act by
defendants in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech and
therefore is not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.
Court of Appeal, 1st District, 2008 (on appeal from San Francisco Co. Superior Court)
___Cal.App 1st___, Cal.Rptr.3d____
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 2nd District, 2002 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
97 Cal.App.4th 227, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 313
UDR is a consumer reporting agency that gathers and sells
information about unlawful detainer cases. Schoendorf, a tenant, after
unsuccessfully attempting to have UDR amend information about her in
UDR's records, sued UDR for acts of negligence. The trial court granted
the defendant's anti-SLAPP motion, on the grounds that UDR had a
constitutionally protected right to disseminate information found in
court records. The appellate court reverses on the grounds that the
information gathered by UDR does not come exclusively from court
records. In addition, the court holds, UDR has a duty under both state
and federal credit reporting statutes, which require "maximum accuracy"
in credit reports, and this duty is not abrogated or reduced by any
First Amendment rights. (See also Decker v. The U.D. Registry, Inc. (2003).
Court of Appeal, 4th District, 2002 (on appeal from Orange Co. Superior Court)
97 Cal.App.4th 174, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 330
Schroeder sued the Irvine City Council over the council's
approval of funds for a voter registration drive (Vote 2000), alleging
that the program was a ruse to campaign for a county measure concerning
development of an abandoned military airbase. The trial court granted
defendants' special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP
statute, ruling that the plaintiff had not shown a likelihood of
proving that the expenditures for Vote 2000 were unlawful political
expenditures. Schroeder appealed, arguing that if his demonstration of
the likelihood of prevailing on his claims was deficient it was because
he was denied permission to conduct "specified discovery" that would
have produced evidence the expenditures were unlawful. In addition, he
argued that the anti-SLAPP statute's provision for attorney fees for
the prevailing party should be construed as permissive or declared
unconstitutional. The appellate court concludes that Schroeder had not
shown good cause to conduct specified discovery; materials sought by
Schroeder were either readily available without the device of discovery
or were irrelevant to his claims as a matter of law. The court also
upholds the constitutionality of the anti-SLAPP statute's provision for
mandatory attorney fees.
Court of Appeal, 3d District, 2004 (on appeal from Placer Co. Superior Court)
115 Cal.App.4th 404, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 242
Scott sued Metabolife for damages for false and deceitful
advertising, alleging that she was injured by a Metabolife product.
Metabolife filed a motion to strike the complaint, arguing that the
causes of action arose from its advertising, labeling, marketing, and
promoting of its product, activities protected by the First Amendment.
The trial court denied the motion to strike the complaint for false
advertising on the grounds that "applying [the anti-SLAPP statute] to
advertising would be stretching the definition of that statute to its
outermost boundaries." The appellate court affirms on the grounds that
Metabolife's advertising of its products for profit does not concern an
issue of public interest as required by the anti-SLAPP statute.
(Between the trial court's ruling and the time this matter was heard in
oral argument before the appellate court,
California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17 became law. Under section 425.17,
commercial advertising is not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.) (See also
Martinez v. Metabolife International, Inc.,
4th District Court of Appeal (2003); Brenton
v. Metabolife International, Inc., 4th District Court of Appeal (2004).)
Court of Appeal, 1st District, 2002 (on appeal from San Francisco Co. Superior Court)
97 Cal.App.4th 798, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 108
Seelig participated in a TV show, "Who Wants to Marry a
Multimillionaire." Before the broadcast Seelig was invited to appear on
a radio talk show. She declined. The radio program hosts discussed on
the air her refusal to be interviewed. Seelig sued the radio program
hosts and the broadcast station owners for damages, alleging defamation
and other causes. The defendants filed both a demurrer and a special
motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial
court denied the anti-SLAPP motion. The appellate court reverses,
concluding that the anti-SLAPP statute applies to the radio broadcast
and plaintiff could not prevail on the merits of her claims, since none
of the alleged defamatory statements were actionable statements of fact.
Court of Appeal, 2nd District, 2001 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
89 Cal.App.4th 141, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 843
Financial sued a number of persons, including Shekhter, alleging
insurance fraud. The suit was settled, with the condition that all
information relating to the suit be kept confidential. Later, in the
present case, Allstate Insurance filed a complaint against Shekhter
alleging insurance fraud. Shekhter filed a cross-complaint against
Allstate but also Financial Indemnity, its lawyers, and others.
Shekhter alleged inter alia that the conduct of Financial's
lawyers in the earlier suit against him included unfair business
practices and violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. Motions by
different defendants to strike specific causes of action in the
cross-complaint were denied by the trial court. The appellate court
reversed. Held: a special motion to strike can apply toa single cause
of action when other claims remain to be resolved. Additionally, actions
by an attorney on behalf of a SLAPP target fall within the scope of the
anti-SLAPP statute. In this case because the actions alleged to be unfair
business practices and violations of the Unruh Act arose in connection
with the prosecution of a lawsuit, they were actions in furtherance of
the right of petition and thus covered by the anti-SLAPP statute.
Court of Appeal, 6th District, 2006 (on appeal from Santa Clara Co. Superior Court)
146 Cal.App.4th 315, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 821
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 6th District, 2005 (on appeal from Santa Clara Co. Superior Court)
130 Cal.App.4th 1563, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 368
Kizilbash accused Siam of abusing his two sons, reporting him to
public officials. He also filed a civil harassment petition against
Siam. In turn, Siam sued Kizilbash for defamation and malicious
prosecution among other causes of action. The trial court denied
Kizilbash's motion to dismiss the entire complaint as a SLAPP. The
appellate court upholds the order except for the claim of malicious
prosecution, holding that such a claim may not be based on a civil
harassment petition. In addition, the court holds that the "litigation
privilege" (Civil Code section 47) is overriden by liability for false
reporting under the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (Penal Code
section 11164 et seq.).
Court of Appeal, 3rd District, 2001 (on appeal from Sacramento Co. Superior Court)
92 Cal.App.4th 1068, 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 397
Simmons filed a cross-complaint for defamation after Allstate
sued him for unfair business practices (alleging that Simmons had
overtreated patients covered by Allstate). The trial court granted a
special motion to strike the cross-complaint. On appeal, Simmons
claimed that the trial court erred in refusing to grant him leave to
amend the cross-complaint after the court had granted the motion. Held:
allowing a SLAPP plaintiff to amend the complaint would undermine the
anti-SLAPP statute's purpose of providing for quick dismissal of
meritless lawsuits.
Court of Appeal, 6th District, 2008 (on appeal from Santa Clara Co. Superior Court)
| Note! Opinion superseded by California Supreme Court's granting of petition for review on July 30, 2008 (S164174). |
(Case summary in preparation.)
Court of Appeal, 2d District, 1999 (on appeal from Los Angeles Co. Superior Court)
71 Cal.App.4th 226, 83 Cal.Rptr. 677
The magazine "Mother Jones" published an article about a custody
battle, ostensively to show how rich and powerful men may use the legal
system to their advantage over women who may have been abused by them.
The subject of the article sued the magazine for defamation. The
appellate court upholds the trial court's dismissal of the suit
following a special motion to strike the complaint. The court concluded
that the subject of the article was not the private affair of an
individual but a public proceeding involving public issues. "[T]he
issues of spousal abuse generated in the custody proceedings are of
public interest when the person accused of the abuse is a nationally
known figure identified with morality campaigns for national leaders
...." The defendant argued that there was a probability he would
prevail on his defamation claim because not all of the magazine article
was privileged under Civil Code section 47, which confers an
absolute privilege on any fair and true report of a judicial
proceeding. The court rejected this argument on the grounds that the
defendant has made his case if he can establish by the evidence that
the gist of the alleged defamatory statements is justified.