The Coltrains contend the amount of the attorney’s fees award is excessive. Defendants, in their cross-appeal, contend the trial court erred by awarding them less fees than they were seeking.

A. Factual Background.

In their motion, defendants sought $75,273.53, representing their attorney’s fees and expenses for the entire action. The trial court, however, ruled it would award only fees in connection for the motion to strike. It asked the parties if they could stipulate to the amount of fees attributable to defendants’ answer. Counsel for the Coltrains answered, "I could not find it in their fee schedule." Counsel for defendants responded, " . . . BB&K, which was pro bono counsel for the defendants . . . , did the vast bulk of the work on the answer. My guess is -- I’d have to check the billing records, but my guess is that there’s probably no more than three or four hours of time . . . with respect to the answer." The court then said, "Okay. I’m just going to make a call on it, then. Someone’s going to have to decide it." It deducted $2,273.53, representing fees for the answer, and awarded only $73,000.

B. Analysis.

"An award of attorney fees is within the trial court’s discretion and that decision will be reversed only if there has been a prejudicial abuse of discretion. [Citation.]" (Guinn v. Dotson (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 262, 268.) "We cannot substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, but only determine if any judge reasonably could have made such an order. [Citation.] Our review of factual findings is limited to a determination of whether there is any substantial evidence to support the trial court’s conclusions. [Citation.]" (In re Marriage of Chandler (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 124, 128; see also Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 659.)

"The major factors to be considered by a court in fixing a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . [are]: ‘the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required and the skill employed in handling the litigation, the attention given, the success of the attorney’s efforts, his learning, his age, and his experience in the particular type of work demanded [citation]; the intricacies and importance of the litigation, the labor and the necessity for skilled legal training and ability in trying the cause, and the time consumed. [Citations.]’ [Citations.]" (In re Marriage of Cueva (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 290, 296, quoting Berry v. Chaplin (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 669, 679.) "[T]he trial judge is regarded as competent from his own knowledge of legal practice to fix the amount of attorney’s fees to be paid to or by civil litigants . . . . [Citations.]" (People v. Amor (1974) 12 Cal.3d 20, 32.)

First, the Coltrains argue the award here was much higher than the awards in most (though not all) reported SLAPP cases. But not all SLAPP cases are created equal. In terms of the list of factors the trial court is to consider -- including difficulty, amount involved, attorney qualifications, and time consumed -- they may vary widely. Accordingly, the amounts awarded in other reported appellate cases is not one of the significant factors.

Second, the Coltrains contend defense counsel’s hourly rate was excessive. In the trial court, the Coltrains challenged only the hourly rate of $320 charged by Mark Goldowitz. Mr. Goldowitz was shown to be a specialist in First Amendment and anti-SLAPP litigation. He had first-hand knowledge of the legislative history of the SLAPP statute. We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by awarding his fees at this rate.

Third, the Coltrains contend defendants’ attorneys spent time on duplicative tasks. In the trial court, the Coltrains labeled any time one of defendants’ lawyers talked to another "duplicative." But "[t]he use of multiple counsel is permissible when the demands of the case warrant hiring more than one attorney." (Pearl, Cal. Attorney Fee Awards (Cont.Ed.Bar Sept. 1997) § 12.20 at p. 12-23.) The trial court could reasonably find this was such a case. Moreover, the trial court could reasonably find defendants’ various attorneys had to talk to each other. There was no showing multiple attorneys ever actually did the same work. (See id.)

Fourth, the Coltrains point out there is no evidence defendants or their counsel made any effort to obviate the motion to strike by discussing it with them before it was filed. While the courts encourage such premotion conferences, and they are statutorily required in other contexts (see, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., § 2023, subd. (a)(9)), the SLAPP statute does not require a premotion conference as a condition of an attorney’s fees award. We decline to impose such a requirement by judicial fiat.

Fifth, defendants contend they were entitled to all fees reasonably related to their motion to strike, and that this necessarily included all fees for the answer. When the trial court deducted fees for the answer, it explained: "An answer is something you have to do in any case. It puts you in a position to file [a special motion to strike]. But I don’t know that it’s related."

"[A] prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 is entitled to recover attorney fees and costs only for the motion to strike, not for the entire action." (Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1381, fn. omitted.) Under the SLAPP statute, a motion to strike "may be filed within 60 days of the service of the complaint . . . ." (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (f).) The statute provides for a stay of discovery (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (g)), but does not provide for a stay of any pleading deadlines. The defendant is free to ask the trial court for an extension of time to plead. Otherwise, however, the defendant must answer (or demur) regardless of whether he or she plans to file a special motion to strike. The answer, as a matter of sound lawyering, must be prepared on the assumption that the motion to strike may be denied. Thus, while the trial court arguably could have come to a different conclusion, it did not abuse its discretion in ruling the answer was not reasonably related to the motion.

Sixth -- and finally -- the Coltrains contend the trial court awarded fees that were not related to the motion to strike. Defendants, on the other hand, contend the trial court abused its discretion by deducting $2,273.53 as fees for the answer. They argue the evidence demonstrated the fees for the answer totaled not more than $379.

Reluctantly, we agree, in a way, with both sides. There was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s allocation of fees as between the motion to strike and the answer. Defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees sought all of their fees, in connection with the entire action. For this reason, their motion contained no plain statement by a witness with personal knowledge that all the fees, or any particular portion of them, actually related to the motion to strike. Obviously, some individual fee items -- even, perhaps, the bulk of them -- did relate to the motion to strike. For example, on April 23, 1996, one attorney spent 5.3 hours to "[p]repare motion to strike." Similarly, on June 25, 1996, another attorney spent 2.0 hours to "[e]dit Kim Shewalter declaration."

Just as obviously, some individual fee items related to the answer, and hence (as the trial court not unreasonably concluded) did not relate to the motion to strike. For example, on April 29, 1996, attorney Mark Goldowitz spent 0.1 hours on "[t]elephone call to Jason Walsh regarding filing of answer . . . ." As defendants point out, the total amount of fees obviously related to the answer in this way total a mere $379.

But what are we to make of such items as "[t]elephone call with Jason Walsh regarding case status," "[r]eview letter from Juliann Anderson to [the Coltrains’ counsel]," or simply, "[t]elephone call with Kim Shewalter"? The Coltrains specifically objected that defendants were not entitled to recover all their fees and demanded an apportionment. There is no evidence from which the trial court could reasonably conclude these items related to the motion to strike, to the answer, or to something entirely different. The trial court could not even assume all work done after May 2, 1996, when the answer was filed, related to the motion to strike. Some of the fee items which defendants admit were related to the answer were for work done after May 2. It would seem defendants failed to meet their burden of proving they were entitled to recover these items. (See Evid. Code, § 500; Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682-683; Pearl, Cal. Attorney Fee Awards, supra, § 14.29 at p. 14-30.)

The trial court apparently reasoned as follows: All the work done by defense counsel in this case had to relate either to the answer or to the special motion to strike. Based on the trial court’s own knowledge of legal practice, a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees for the preparation of the answer in this case would be $2,273.53. Hence, the rest of the fees must relate to the motion to strike.

The problem with this reasoning, in the circumstances here, was that defendants were also represented by BB&K. Their motion, however, did not seek any attorney’s fees for work done by BB&K, and there was no evidence as to how much of the work on the answer had been done by BB&K. Even assuming the trial court could have accepted defense counsel’s unsworn representation that BB&K did nearly all the work, so that only three or four hours’ worth of the fees sought related to the answer, it evidently did not; instead, it came up with a number for which there was no evidentiary basis.

If defendants had submitted a declaration to the effect that, except for the $379 of fees that related to the answer, all the attorney’s fees sought related to the motion to strike, the trial court could reasonably have relied on it. Given the absence of any such declaration, however, we must reverse.

Regarding defendants' entitlement to an award of attorney's fees, the order appealed from is affirmed. Regarding the amount of the award of attorney' s fees, the order appealed from is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Defendants shall recover attorney's fees and costs on appeal, in amounts to be determined, upon proper application, in the trial court. (Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 785; Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at pp. 659-660; Evans v. Unkow (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1499-1500.)

Richli, J.

We concur: Ramirez, P.J., and Gaut, J.