An analysis measuring newsworthiness of facts about an otherwise private person involuntarily involved in an event of public interest by their relevance to a newsworthy subject matter incorporates considerable deference to reporters and editors, avoiding the likelihood of unconstitutional interference with the freedom of the press to report truthfully on matters of legitimate public interest. [FN 8] In general, it is not for a court or jury to say how a particular story is best covered. The constitutional privilege to publish truthful material "ceases to operate only when an editor abuses his broad discretion to publish matters that are of legitimate public interest." (Gilbert, supra, 665 F.2d at p. 308.) By confining our interference to extreme cases, the courts "avoid[] unduly limiting . . . the exercise of effective editorial judgment." (Virgil v. Time, Inc., supra, 527 F.2d at p. 1129.) Nor is newsworthiness governed by the tastes or limited interests of an individual judge or juror; a publication is newsworthy if some reasonable members of the community could entertain a legitimate interest in it. Our analysis thus does not purport to distinguish among the various legitimate purposes that may be served by truthful publications and broadcasts. As we said in Gill v. Hearst, supra, 40 Cal.2d at page 229, "the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression apply with equal force to the publication whether it be a news report or an entertainment feature . . . ." Thus, newsworthiness is not limited to "news" in the narrow sense of reports of current events. "It extends also to the use of names, likenesses or facts in giving information to the public for purposes of education, amusement or enlightenment, when the public may reasonably be expected to have a legitimate interest in what is published." (Rest.2d Torts, § 652D, com. j, p. 393; accord, Gilbert, supra, 665 F.2d at p. 308; Virgil v. Time, Inc., supra, 527 F.2d at p. 1129; see also Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., supra, 201 Cal.App.2d at p. 746 [matters of legitimate public interest include, for example, "the reproduction of past events, travelogues and biographies" ]; Vassiliades v. Garfinkel's Brooks Bros., supra, 492 A.2d at p. 589 [includes "'information concerning interesting phases of human activity'"].)

[FN 8] Although we therefore believe our conclusions in this case accord with the dictates of the federal Constitution, we cannot be sure without clearer guidance from the United States Supreme Court. Unless we abandon the private facts tort completely, we appear to be at a theoretical risk of creating unconstitutional liability, since the high court has thus far declined to decide "whether truthful publications may ever be subjected to civil or criminal liability consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, or to put it another way, whether the State may ever define and protect an area of privacy free from unwanted publicity in the press. . . ." (Cox Broadcasting Corp., supra, 420 U.S. at p. 491; see also Florida Star, supra, 491 U.S. at p. 533 [again declining to answer that question]; Time, Inc. v. Hill, supra, 385 U.S. at p. 383, fn. 7 [in false light privacy case, reserving question whether truthful publication of offensive private facts may constitutionally be punished, and noting a commentator' s view that newsworthiness privilege may be so "' overpowering as virtually to swallow the [privacy] tort'"].)

Finally, an analysis focusing on relevance allows courts and juries to decide most cases involving persons involuntarily involved in events of great public interest without "balanc[ing] interests in ad hoc fashion in each case" (Briscoe, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 542, fn. 18). The articulation of standards that do not require "ad hoc resolution of the competing interest in each . . . case" (Gertz v. Welch (1974) 418 U.S. 323, 343) is favored in areas affecting First Amendment rights, because the relative predictability of results reached under such standards minimizes the inadvertent chilling of protected speech, and because standards that can be applied objectively provide a stronger shield against the unconstitutional punishment of unpopular speech. (Ibid.; Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy (1968) 56 Cal.L.Rev. 935, 938-945 (hereafter Nimmer); see also Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union (1997) ___ U.S. ___ [117 S.Ct. 2329, 2341, 2344-2345] [Internet speech prohibitions employing undefined term "indecent" and appealing to "community standards" of what is "patently offensive" are, absent further narrowing of prohibitions, unconstitutionally vague and uncertain].)

On the other hand, no mode of analyzing newsworthiness can be applied mechanically or without consideration of its proper boundaries. To observe that the newsworthiness of private facts about a person involuntarily thrust into the public eye depends, in the ordinary case, on the existence of a logical nexus between the newsworthy event or activity and the facts revealed is not to deny that the balance of free press and privacy interests may require a different conclusion when the intrusiveness of the revelation is greatly disproportionate to its relevance. Intensely personal or intimate revelations might not, in a given case, be considered newsworthy, especially where they bear only slight relevance to a topic of legitimate public concern. (See Kapellas, supra, 1 Cal.3d at pp. 37-38 [Public interest in free flow of information will outweigh interest in individual privacy "[i]f the publication does not proceed widely beyond the bounds of propriety and reason in disclosing facts about those closely related to an aspirant for public office . . . ."]; Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., supra, 8 F.3d at pp. 1234-1235 [although personal facts revealed in book at issue were newsworthy because germane to the book' s subject matter, that protection may not extend to publication of "intimate physical details the publicizing of which would be not merely embarrassing and painful but deeply shocking to the average person"].) [FN 9]

[FN 9] Contrary to Justice Brown's characterization of the foregoing test for newsworthiness as a "radical departure" from Kapellas, supra, 1 Cal.3d 20 (conc. and dis. opn. of Brown, J., post, at p. 4), the stated test is a natural adaptation of Kapellas to a different kind of situation, one involving a private figure involuntarily caught up in a newsworthy event. (Cf. Forsher, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 812 [applying both the Kapellas factors and additional relevant considerations].) To track the language of Kapellas, supra, 1 Cal.3d at page 36, the "incident" in this case -- i.e., the accident and rescue -- concededly is of legitimate public concern. Viewing, therefore, the "facts published" in the context of the whole, the broadcast' s intrusion into Ruth' s private life is minimal as against the substantial relevance the facts bear to the subject matter, in particular the various aspects of the rescue and Nurse Carnahan' s responsibilities in connection therewith. That Ruth did not "voluntarily accede[] to a position of public notoriety" is not determinative, but only one of a "variety of factors" to be weighed. Ibid.)

A few words are in order at this point regarding the right of privacy secured by article I, section 1 of the California Constitution. The Court of Appeal, citing Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pages 37-38 (Hill), equated the judicial balancing undertaken in delineation of the common law right of privacy to the balancing of interests this court has prescribed for evaluating claims raised under our state' s constitutional right of privacy. Defendants attack the Court of Appeal' s adoption of Hill's balancing test in the common law tort context, arguing that under the federal Constitution newsworthiness is a complete bar to liability, rather than merely an interest to be balanced against private or state-protected interests.

We agree with defendants that the publication of truthful, lawfully obtained material of legitimate public concern is constitutionally privileged and does not create liability under the private facts tort. As discussed above, however, a certain amount of interest-balancing does occur in deciding whether material is of legitimate public concern, or in formulating rules for that decision. To that extent, the Court of Appeal' s analogy to Hill was not in error.

In Hill, we held, inter alia, that article I, section 1 of the California Constitution protects Californians against invasions of privacy by nongovernmental as well as governmental parties. (Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 15-20.) Decisions concerning the tort actions for invasion of privacy have, in addition, sometimes linked the plaintiffs' protected interest to that constitutional provision. (See, e.g., Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1490-1491 [intrusion plaintiff's interest protected by constitutional privacy provision]; Melvin v. Reid, supra, 112 Cal.App. at p. 291 [in private facts case predating addition of "privacy" to article I, section 1, plaintiff deemed protected by that section's guarantee of right to pursue and obtain happiness].) The Hill court itself sought to "draw upon the one hundred years of legal experience surrounding the term 'privacy'" in formulating the correct analysis of claims brought under the state Constitution. (Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 27.) Thus, these two sources of protection for privacy -- the common law and the state Constitution -- are not unrelated. Nothing in Hill or our more recent constitutional privacy cases (American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren (1997) 16 Cal.4th 307; Loder v. City of Glendale (1997) 14 Cal.4th 846), however, suggests that the conceptual framework developed for resolving privacy claims under the California Constitution was intended to supplant the common law tort analysis or preclude its independent development. Nor did we have occasion in those cases to address the analytical means by which a state-created privacy right, whether of constitutional or common law origin, may be accommodated to conflicting and superior demands of federal constitutional interests, as for example those protected by the First Amendment.

Turning now to the case at bar, we consider whether the possibly private facts complained of here -- broadly speaking, Ruth's appearance and words during the rescue and evacuation -- were of legitimate public interest. If so, summary judgment was properly entered. "[B]ecause unnecessarily protracted litigation would have a chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights, speedy resolution of cases involving free speech is desirable. [Citation.] Therefore, summary judgment is a favored remedy [in such cases] . . . ." (Good Government Group of Seal Beach, Inc. v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 672, 685; see also Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., supra, 8 F.3d at p. 1234 [Affirming summary judgment for defendants in private facts case: "To any suggestion that the outer bounds of liability should be left to a jury to decide we reply that in cases involving the rights protected by the speech and press clauses of the First Amendment the courts insist on judicial control of the jury."].) Nonetheless, the basic question raised on a defense motion for summary judgment, and on review of such judgment, is the same in a privacy action against media defendants as in other cases: does the motion record demonstrate the existence of triable issues of fact, or was the defense entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co., supra, 54 Cal.App.3d at p. 1046.)

We agree at the outset with defendants that the subject matter of the broadcast as a whole was of legitimate public concern. Automobile accidents are by their nature of interest to that great portion of the public that travels frequently by automobile. The rescue and medical treatment of accident victims is also of legitimate concern to much of the public, involving as it does a critical service that any member of the public may someday need. The story of Ruth's difficult extrication from the crushed car, the medical attention given her at the scene, and her evacuation by helicopter was of particular interest because it highlighted some of the challenges facing emergency workers dealing with serious accidents.

The more difficult question is whether Ruth's appearance and words as she was extricated from the overturned car, placed in the helicopter and transported to the hospital were of legitimate public concern. Pursuant to the analysis outlined earlier, we conclude the disputed material was newsworthy as a matter of law. One of the dramatic and interesting aspects of the story as a whole is its focus on flight nurse Carnahan, who appears to be in charge of communications with other emergency workers, the hospital base and Ruth, and who leads the medical assistance to Ruth at the scene. Her work is portrayed as demanding and important and as involving a measure of personal risk (e.g., in crawling under the car to aid Ruth despite warnings that gasoline may be dripping from the car). [FN 10] The broadcast segment makes apparent that this type of emergency care requires not only medical knowledge, concentration and courage, but an ability to talk and listen to severely traumatized patients. One of the challenges Carnahan faces in assisting Ruth is the confusion, pain and fear that Ruth understandably feels in the aftermath of the accident. For that reason the broadcast video depicting Ruth's injured physical state (which was not luridly shown) and audio showing her disorientation and despair were substantially relevant to the segment' s newsworthy subject matter.

[FN 10] Plaintiffs dispute whether there was any such fuel leak. It is undisputed, however, that during the broadcast segment a firefighter or paramedic tells Carnahan there is leaking gasoline, and she nevertheless crawls under the car to minister to Ruth.

Plaintiffs argue that showing Ruth's "intimate private, medical facts and her suffering was not necessary to enable the public to understand the significance of the accident or the rescue as a public event." The standard, however, is not necessity. That the broadcast could have been edited to exclude some of Ruth's words and images and still excite a minimum degree of viewer interest is not determinative. Nor is the possibility that the members of this or another court, or a jury, might find a differently edited broadcast more to their taste or even more interesting. The courts do not, and constitutionally could not, sit as superior editors of the press. (Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., supra, 870 F.2d at p. 275 ["Exuberant judicial blue-penciling after-the-fact would blunt the quills of even the most honorable journalists." ]; Gilbert, supra, 665 F.2d at p. 308 [Liability for disclosure of private facts is limited "to the extreme case, thereby providing the breathing space needed by the press to properly exercise effective editorial judgment." ].)

The challenged material was thus substantially relevant to the newsworthy subject matter of the broadcast and did not constitute a "morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake." (Rest.2d Torts, § 652D, com. h, p. 391, italics added.) Nor can we say the broadcast material was so lurid and sensational in emotional tone, or so intensely personal in content, as to make its intrusiveness disproportionate to its relevance. Under these circumstances, the material was, as a matter of law, of legitimate public concern. Summary judgment was therefore properly entered against Ruth on her cause of action for publication of private facts. [FN 11] As to Wayne, he is glimpsed only fleetingly in the broadcast video and is never heard. The broadcast includes no images or information regarding him that could be offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. Summary judgment was therefore also proper on Wayne's cause of action for publication of private facts.

[FN 11] The United States Supreme Court has expressly reserved the question whether the government, in cases where information has been acquired unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source, may ever punish not only the unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing publication as well. (Florida Star, supra, 491 U.S. at pp. 533-536.) We do not decide that question in the present case, regarding it as going to the extent of allowable damages for intrusion. (See fn. 18, post.)

One might argue that, while the contents of the broadcast were of legitimate interest in that they reflected on the nature and quality of emergency rescue services, the images and sounds that potentially allowed identification of Ruth as the accident victim were irrelevant and of no legitimate public interest in a broadcast that aired some months after the accident and had little or no value as "hot" news. (See Briscoe, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 537 [while reports of the facts of "long past" crimes are newsworthy, identification of the actor in such crimes "usually serves little independent public purpose"].) We do not take that view. It is difficult to see how the subject broadcast could have been edited to avoid completely any possible identification without severely undercutting its legitimate descriptive and narrative impact. As broadcast, the segment included neither Ruth's full name nor direct display of her face. She was nonetheless arguably identifiable by her first name (used in recorded dialogue), her voice, her general appearance and the recounted circumstances of the accident (which, as noted, had previously been published, with Ruth' s full name and city of residence, in a newspaper). [FN 12] In a video documentary of this type, however, the use of that degree of truthful detail would seem not only relevant, but essential to the narrative.

[FN 12] Although complete lack of identification or identifiability would seemingly defeat a private facts claim, as there could be no injury, an invasion of privacy does not necessarily depend on whether the plaintiff's full name was broadcast or whether she was identifiable to all viewers. (See Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., supra, 8 F.3d at p. 1233 [Even if plaintiffs' names had been changed in nonfiction book, factual details would have identified them "to anyone who has known [them] well for a long time (members of their families, for example), or who knew them before they got married; and no more is required for liability either in defamation law [citations] or in privacy law. [Citations.]"].)

Of the four privacy torts identified by Prosser, the tort of intrusion into private places, conversations or matter is perhaps the one that best captures the common understanding of an "invasion of privacy." It encompasses unconsented-to physical intrusion into the home, hospital room or other place the privacy of which is legally recognized, as well as unwarranted sensory intrusions such as eavesdropping, wiretapping, and visual or photographic spying. (See Rest.2d Torts, § 652B, com. b., pp. 378-379, and illustrations.) It is in the intrusion cases that invasion of privacy is most clearly seen as an affront to individual dignity. "[A] measure of personal isolation and personal control over the conditions of its abandonment is of the very essence of personal freedom and dignity, is part of what our culture means by these concepts. A man whose home may be entered at the will of another, whose conversations may be overheard at the will of another, whose marital and familial intimacies may be overseen at the will of another, is less of a man, has less human dignity, on that account. He who may intrude upon another at will is the master of the other and, in fact, intrusion is a primary weapon of the tyrant." (Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser (1964) 39 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 962, 973-974, fn. omitted.)

Despite its conceptual centrality, the intrusion tort has received less judicial attention than the private facts tort, and its parameters are less clearly defined. The leading California decision is Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., supra, 187 Cal.App.3d 1463 (Miller). Miller, which like the present case involved a news organization's videotaping the work of emergency medical personnel, adopted the Restatement's formulation of the cause of action: "One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person." (Rest.2d Torts, § 652B; Miller, supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at p. 1482.)

As stated in Miller and the Restatement, therefore, the action for intrusion has two elements: (1) intrusion into a private place, conversation or matter, (2) in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person. We consider the elements in that order.

We ask first whether defendants "intentionally intrude[d], physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another," that is, into a place or conversation private to Wayne or Ruth. (Rest.2d Torts, § 652B; Miller, supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at p. 1482.) "[T]here is no liability for the examination of a public record concerning the plaintiff . . . . [Or] for observing him or even taking his photograph while he is walking on the public highway . . . ." (Rest.2d Torts, § 652B, com. c., pp. 379-380; see, e.g., Aisenson v. American Broadcasting Co. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 146, 162-163 [where judge who was subject of news story was filmed from public street as he walked from his home to his car, any invasion of privacy was "extremely de minimis" ]; see also 1 McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy (1997) § 5.10[A][2], pp. 5-111 to 5-113 [collecting cases].) To prove actionable intrusion, the plaintiff must show the defendant penetrated some zone of physical or sensory privacy surrounding, or obtained unwanted access to data about, the plaintiff. The tort is proven only if the plaintiff had an objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude in the place, conversation or data source. (Rest.2d, § 652B, com. c., p. 379; see, e.g., People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd. (Nev. 1995) 895 P.2d 1269, 1280-1281 [plaintiff animal trainer had no expectation of seclusion or solitude in backstage preparation area]; Frankel v. Warwick Hotel (E.D.Pa. 1995) 881 F.Supp. 183, 188 [father's meddling in son's marriage not intrusion where there was no "physical or sensory penetration of a person' s zone of seclusion"].)

Cameraman Cooke's mere presence at the accident scene and filming of the events occurring there cannot be deemed either a physical or sensory intrusion on plaintiffs' seclusion. Plaintiffs had no right of ownership or possession of the property where the rescue took place, nor any actual control of the premises. Nor could they have had a reasonable expectation that members of the media would be excluded or prevented from photographing the scene; for journalists to attend and record the scenes of accidents and rescues is in no way unusual or unexpected. (Cf. Pen. Code, § § 409.5, subd. (d), 409.6, subd. (d) [exempting press representatives from certain emergency closure orders].)

Two aspects of defendants' conduct, however, raise triable issues of intrusion on seclusion. First, a triable issue exists as to whether both plaintiffs had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the interior of the rescue helicopter, which served as an ambulance. Although the attendance of reporters and photographers at the scene of an accident is to be expected, we are aware of no law or custom permitting the press to ride in ambulances or enter hospital rooms during treatment without the patient's consent. (See Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra, 33 Cal.App.3d at p. 660 [accepting, subject to proof at trial, intrusion plaintiff' s theory she had "an exclusive right of occupancy of her hospital room" as against investigator]; Miller, supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1489-1490 [Rejecting intrusion defendant' s claim that plaintiff consented to media's entry into home by calling paramedics: "One seeking emergency care does not thereby 'open the door' for persons without any clearly identifiable and justifiable official reason who may wish to enter the premises where the medical aid is being administered."].) Other than the two patients and Cooke, only three people were present in the helicopter, all Mercy Air staff. As the Court of Appeal observed, "[i]t is neither the custom nor the habit of our society that any member of the public at large or its media representatives may hitch a ride in an ambulance and ogle as paramedics care for an injured stranger." (See also Green v. Chicago Tribune Co., supra, 675 N.E.2d at p. 252 [hospital room not public place]; Barber v. Time, Inc., supra, 159 S.W.2d at p. 295 ["Certainly, if there is any right of privacy at all, it should include the right to obtain medical treatment at home or in a hospital . . . without personal publicity."].)

Second, Ruth was entitled to a degree of privacy in her conversations with Carnahan and other medical rescuers at the accident scene, and in Carnahan' s conversations conveying medical information regarding Ruth to the hospital base. Cooke, perhaps, did not intrude into that zone of privacy merely by being present at a place where he could hear such conversations with unaided ears. But by placing a microphone on Carnahan's person, amplifying and recording what she said and heard, defendants may have listened in on conversations the parties could reasonably have expected to be private.