In the end, Stevens's injury was imposed directly by the private conduct of Tillman and associates -- the sit-in, the verbal threats, the slander, and so on. Her argument is that section 1985(3) supplies a remedy for abuse heaped on someone on racial grounds, even if there is neither state action nor a deprivation of any federally-secured entitlement (other than the entitlement, employed here in a perfectly circular way, to be free of racially-motivated abuse). We must assume, given the posture of the case (judgment at the close of the evidence), that the jury would have inferred that Tillman had race on her mind when trying to get rid of Stevens. Still, no case in the Supreme Court has used section 1985(3) in this way, and only one appellate decision, Life Insurance Co. of North America v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1979), has done so. Reichardt preceded both Novotny and Scott and is inconsistent with them, as well as with Cohen in this circuit. Among cases from the Supreme Court see, e.g., Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 657, 28 L.Ed. 274, 4 S. Ct. 152 (1884) (parallel criminal statute properly used to penalize private terror that affected the right to vote for a member of Congress); United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76, 28 L.Ed. 673, 5 S. Ct. 35 (1884) (same statute used to penalize deprivation of homestead interest secured by federal law); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 285, 36 L.Ed. 429, 12 S.Ct. 617 (1892) (federal right of persons in federal custody to be free from attack); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755-60, 16 L. Ed. 2d 239, 86 S. Ct. 1170 (1966) (federal statutory right to use public accommodations, plus constitutional right to travel); Griffin (right to travel). Many cases -- all before Griffin, to be sure -- say that without the federal "hook" section 1985(3) and cognate criminal laws do not provide relief for ordinary criminal assaults and batteries, even if the aggressor acted with a racial motive. E.g., Waddell, 112 U.S. at 79-80. Reichardt, the only modern departure from this understanding, has been ignored even in the Ninth Circuit. Havas v. Thornton, 609 F.2d 372, 374 (9th Cir. 1979) (the plaintiff must show a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law). But cf. Abrams v. 11 Cornwell Co, 695 F.2d 34, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1982) (pre-Scott case suggesting willingness to treat violation of state law alone as an adequate basis of a section 1985(3) claim).

This wheel will continue to turn. Changing interpretation has been the only constant about section 1985(3). See Grimes v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1359, 1363-1366 (7th Cir. 1985) (tracing the history); Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1435 (7th Cir. 1988) (as if to prove the point, disagreeing with Grimes, without discussing it, on the statute's coverage of non-racial, political conspiracies). Which way it will turn is anyone's guess. Strong arguments may be made for making all racially-motivated harms actionable -- though whether this should be a federal tort is a legislative question. If Congress spoke to the subject through section 1985(3), it disguised its meaning well. We follow the accepted understanding of section 1985(3) without pretending to certainty that the understanding is right -- either as an interpretation of the law or as a wise rule.

No doubt Stevens suffered injury at Tillman's hands. No doubt Tillman's methods were crude. Perhaps Stevens had lingered beyond her time at Mollison School. Public officials (Tillman was then only aspiring to office) should live by high standards rather than asking "what can I get away with?". Civilized discourse should be the aspiration of us all. The jury found that Tillman uttered quite a few falsehoods, and the discourse was neither dispassionate nor reasoned. To the extent Tillman followed the precept that "nothing succeeds like excess" she was within her rights under the first amendment and the Illinois law of libel, save for the $1.00 the jury found she owes. To the extent Tillman and associates put Stevens in fear for her safety, causing physical and mental distress, the right avenue was a suit for assault under state law. That would have been a straightforward claim. Stevens chose to bring a federal suit under a statute that required her to jump through more hoops than she could manage. She may take comfort from the dollar, for certainly the verdict and this opinion do not vindicate Tillman's methods. They show, however, the limited reach of federal law.

AFFIRMED

JJ. Cummings and Coffey, concurring.