B. The Summary Judgment Motion.

1. The perfection of FTCR's appeal from the denial of its anti-SLAPP motion divested the trial court of jurisdiction to entertain the motion for summary judgment.

Code of Civil Procedure section 916 (section 916) states: "Except as provided in [statutes not implicated here], the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected thereby, including enforcement of the judgment or order, but the trial court may proceed upon any other matter embraced in the action and not affected by the judgment or order." (§ 916, subd. (a).)

"The purpose of the rule depriving the trial court of jurisdiction during the pending appeal is to protect the appellate court's jurisdiction by preserving the status quo until the appeal is decided. The rule prevents the trial court from rendering an appeal futile by altering the appealed judgment or order by conducting other proceedings that may affect it. [Citation.]" (Elsea v. Saberi (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 625, 629 (Elsea ); Dowling v. Zimmerman (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1428, quoting Elsea.) "Accordingly, whether a matter is 'embraced' in or 'affected' by a judgment within the meaning of section 916 depends upon whether postjudgment trial court proceedings on the particular matter would have any impact on the 'effectiveness' of the appeal. If so, the proceedings are stayed; if not, the proceedings are permitted." (Elsea, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 629.)

The parties dispute whether the issues raised in Pasadena's motion for summary judgment were "embraced" or "affected" by the order denying FTCR's anti-SLAPP motion. FTCR argues that they were and that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by ruling on the summary judgment motion while its appeal was pending. Pasadena insists the court retained jurisdiction to entertain the motion because the underlying merits of its declaratory relief claim were not a matter "embraced in" or "affected by" the pending appeal. Pasadena is mistaken. Once the appeal was perfected, further trial court proceedings were automatically stayed.

Pasadena's argument is premised on the fact that the trial court addressed only the first prong of the anti-SLAPP test in denying FTCR's motion to strike. That reliance is misplaced. FTCR's section 425.16 motion sought to strike, as legally insufficient, the entirety of Pasadena's cross-action. That whole motion was denied, and it is that ruling from which an appeal was taken.

Pasadena's argument that resolution of the appeal from the denial of the anti-SLAPP motion is confined to a consideration of the precise grounds on which the trial court ruled is incorrect as a matter of law. The appeal was taken from the ruling denying FTCR's special motion to strike. While the rationale for a ruling may be of interest or even instructive, it is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that, with limited exceptions not applicable here, we review the trial court's ruling, not its rationale. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 980-981; Aheroni v. Maxwell (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 284, 292.)

The anti-SLAPP law is designed to expeditiously dispose of meritless lawsuits based on a defendant's exercise of free speech or petition rights. (Dixon v. Superior Court (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 733, 741.) In an effort to further this statutory goal, the Legislature amended section 425.16 in 1999 to make orders granting or denying anti-SLAPP motions immediately appealable. (§ 425.16, subd. (j).) Prior to that change, a defendant whose meritorious anti-SLAPP motion was denied had only two options. "The first is to file a writ of appeal, which is discretionary and rarely granted. The second is to defend the lawsuit. If the defendant wins, the anti-SLAPP statute is useless and has failed to protect the defendant's constitutional rights." (Cal. Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1675 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.), p. 6.) The amendment to section 425.16 reflects the Legislature's express intention to automatically stay trial court proceedings. A Senate Judiciary Committee report on A.B. 1675 creating the right of appeal from an anti-SLAPP order, states: "This bill would provide that an order granting or denying a special motion to strike shall be immediately appealable, and therefore, the perfecting of the appeal would stay proceedings in the trial court." (Sen. Com. On Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1675 [1999-2000 Reg. Sess.], as amended May 28, 1999, p. 3, emphasis added; see also Sen. Rules Com., Off. Of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1675 [1999-2000 Reg. Sess.), as amended July 12, 1999, p. 3 [relying on Code Civil Procedure section 916, and explaining that "the perfecting of the appeal [from an order on an anti-SLAPP motion] would stay proceedings in the trial court."].) [FN 23]

[FN 23] We take judicial notice of portions of the legislative history of section 425.16. (See Evid.Code, §§ 452, subd. (h), 459, subd. (a); Schmidt v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 23, 30, fn. 10 ["In a search to discern legislative intent, an appellate court is entitled to take judicial notice of the various legislative materials, including committee reports, underlying the enactment of a statute."].)

Our conclusion that the trial court was divested of jurisdiction to consider the merits of Pasadena's summary judgment motion once FTCR filed its appeal finds direct support in a recent decision by Division Four, Mattel, Inc. v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1179 (Mattel ). After an appeal from the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion was filed in a malicious prosecution action, the trial court set a trial date notwithstanding the pending appeal. The appellate court held that an appeal from the denial of a special motion to strike automatically stays all trial court proceedings on the merits of the underlying action pending resolution of the appeal. In words equally applicable to this action, the court explained:

"Here, the language significant within section 916 for purposes of our discussion is the phrase 'upon the matters embraced therein or affected thereby.' The special motion to strike was directed to the only cause of action asserted ... and challenged its legal viability. That is also the focus on appeal. It follows that the appeal embraces the entirety of the action and the automatic stay is triggered. Thus, the trial court was divested of jurisdiction upon perfection of the appeal and it acted in excess of jurisdiction by setting a trial date." (Mattel, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1190.) [FN 24]

[FN 24] The Supreme Court has granted review of the only published decision to disagree with Mattel on this point. In Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 273 [6 Cal .Rptr.3d 325] (Varian ), review granted March 3, 2004, S121400 [10 Cal.Rptr.3d 536], the court held the filing of an appeal from the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion does not automatically stay the entire trial court proceeding. (Id. at p. 355 and fn. 16.) In granting review, the Supreme Court ordered the parties in Varian to limit their argument to the issue of whether "an appeal from the denial of a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16) effect[s] an automatic stay of the trial court proceedings[.]" (10 Cal.Rptr. 536.) Given the legislative purpose underlying a defendant's right of immediate appeal under section 425.16, subdivision (j), we anticipate the Supreme Court will conclude Varian was wrongly decided.

Under Mattel and the plain language of section 916, we conclude the trial court acted in excess of its subject matter jurisdiction by entertaining and ruling upon Pasadena's motion for summary judgment while FTCR's appeal from the denial of its anti-SLAPP motion was pending before this court. "[T]he perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected thereby." (Code Civ. Proc., § 916, subd. (a).) The issue of the validity of Pasadena's cross-action for declaratory relief was embraced within the trial court's order denying FTCR's special motion to strike. That very issue was adjudicated by the trial court's extrajurisdictional ruling on the summary judgment motion, which must be reversed. [FN 25]

[FN 25] We find no merit in Pasadena's argument that FTCR should not be permitted to invoke section 425.16's purpose of quickly eliminating meritless lawsuits because, at the hearing on its motion, FTCR "urged" the trial court not to address the second prong of the anti-SLAPP test. The record reflects otherwise. At the hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion, the court indicated its intention to rule not just on the first prong, but to find Pasadena had shown a probability of prevailing on the merits. The court later "backed off" that portion of its proposed ruling after FTCR pointed out the court logically could not determine Pasadena was likely to prevail without first deciding the foundational question as to whether the case presented a live controversy, an issue on which the trial court expressly declined to rule.

C. The Motion for "private attorney general" fees.

The final portion of the consolidated appeals involves FTCR's motion to recover attorneys' fees under the "private attorney general" statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, based on obtaining a preemptory writ ordering Pasadena to fulfill its ministerial obligations under Government Code section 34460. The trial court denied the attorneys' fee motion on the grounds that FTCR's participation in the writ proceeding had not been "necessary" to its successful outcome, and that FTCR, as sponsor of the Oaks Initiative, had a "direct interest" in the enforcement of the measure, which precluded it from obtaining a fee award. FTCR insists the trial court misconstrued section 1021.5 and applied an incorrect legal standard. We agree.

1. The Standard of review.

Decisions awarding or denying attorneys' fees are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. The trial court's discretion "'"is not a whimsical, uncontrolled power, but a legal discretion, which is subject to the limitations of legal principles governing the subject of its action, and to reversal on appeal where no reasonable basis for the action is shown. [Citations.]"'" (City of Sacramento v. Drew (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1287, 1297 (City of Sacramento ).) The discretion is subject to the limitations of the legal principles governing the subject of the action. The question is whether the trial court's grounds for denying a fee award are consistent with substantive law of section 1021.5 and, if so, whether their application to the facts falls within the range of discretion conferred under 1021.5, read in light of the purposes and policy of that statute. To decide this question, we first determine whether the court understood the appropriate legal standard. If it did, we then determine whether the application of that standard to the facts was within the scope of its discretion under the statute. (Punsly v. Ho (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 102, 113 (Punsly ); see also Crawford v. Board of Education (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1397, 1404-1406 (Crawford ) [To determine if discretion is abused, the appellate court reviews "the entire record, paying particular attention to the trial court's stated reasons in denying or awarding fees and whether it applied the proper standards of law in reaching its decision." (Citation omitted); Hewlett v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 499, 544 (Hewlett ) [same].) With these principles in mind, we turn to the grounds advanced by the trial court for its ruling.

2. The Purpose of Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5

Section 1021.5 codified the judicially developed "private attorney general" fee doctrine. (Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 933 (Woodland Hills ).) The primary purpose of the statute is "'to encourage suits effectuating a strong [public] policy by awarding substantial attorney's fees ... to those who successfully bring such suits and thereby bring about benefits to a broad class of citizens.' [(D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974)] (11 Cal.3d 1, 27 .)" (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 43.) The doctrine is premised "upon the recognition that privately initiated lawsuits are often essential to the effectuation of the fundamental public policies embodied in constitutional or statutory provisions, and that, without some mechanism authorizing the award of attorney fees, private actions to enforce such important public policies will as a practical matter frequently be infeasible." (Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 933.)

Section 1021.5, in relevant part, authorizes the trial court to "award attorneys' fees to a successful party ... in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, [and] (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement, ... are such as to make the award appropriate." [FN 26] Pasadena concedes FTCR is a "successful party" whose intervention "has 'resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting public interest,' thereby conferring a 'significant benefit' on 'the general public or a large class of persons.'"

[FN 26] A third statutory factor, whether "such fees should ... in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any," is not implicated in this declaratory relief action. (§ 1021.5, subd. (c); Press v. Lucky Stores (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311, 318, fn. 5.)

The issue is whether the trial court erred as a matter of law by misconstruing and misapplying the "necessity and financial burden of private enforcement" prong of section 1021.5, subdivision (b). We conclude it did.

3. The "necessity ... of private enforcement" criterion is met here.

The initial writ of mandate petition seeking to force Pasadena to fulfill its ministerial obligations under section 34460 and certify the Initiative was filed by Amy. In both the answer to the petition and the cross-complaint for declaratory relief filed against Amy, Pasadena admitted it had not complied, and did not intend to comply, with section 34460 because it believed "the initiative is unconstitutional." Amy responded that he was not a proper party to Pasadena's cross-complaint. No actual controversy existed with respect to the constitutionality of the Initiative, because Amy had "no legal interest in that issue," and "neither "agree[d] nor disagree[d] with [Pasadena's] position on the legality of the [Initiative]." On the same date Amy filed his reply, FTCR sought and obtained leave to intervene on the ground that Pasadena's arguments in opposition to Amy's writ petition "raise[d] issues of fundamental importance to the integrity of democratic process," and posed a grave threat to the initiative process as a whole. FTCR filed its complaint-in-intervention and joined Amy's writ petition.

FTCR's arguments in support of the writ petition went further than Amy's. Amy, who freely admitted "no legal interest in determining the constitutionality of the [Initiative]," argued essentially that Pasadena was not free to effectively "veto" the Initiative by refusing to perform its admitted ministerial duties under section 34460, simply because it was "disappointed with the results of an election." FTCR went much further. In addition to supporting Amy's contentions, FTCR presented arguments and authorities which directly refuted Pasadena's purported "defense," on which the trial court expressly relied in granting the writ of mandate. Nevertheless, when ruling on FTCR's motion for private attorney general fees, the court denied the motion on the ground that it "probably would have granted" the writ petition anyway. In making its finding, the court essentially adopted Pasadena's assertion that FTCR was not entitled to fees because it had not made a "unique contribution" to Amy's pending litigation.

The essence of the trial court's ruling was that FTCR's intervention was "not of a significant level," because Amy had already raised the issue of Pasadena's duty to certify the Initiative irrespective of its views as to its validity, a contention with which the court "probably" would have agreed in granting the writ. The practical effect of the ruling required FTCR to show that the court would have denied the requested relief "but for" its intervention in order to recover attorneys' fees. We cannot sanction such a rule.

The trial court misinterpreted and misapplied the portion of section 1021.5 which requires a finding that the "necessity of private enforcement ... are such as to make the award appropriate." (§ 1021.5, subd. (b).) In the first place, the "necessity of private enforcement" prong of the section 1021.5 test "'looks to the adequacy of public enforcement and seeks economic equalization of representation in cases where private enforcement is necessary.'" (City of Sacramento, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 1299, original emphasis; accord Harbor v. Deukmejian (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1078, 1103 ["It is obvious that private enforcement to give effect to [a Bill amending the Welfare and Institutions Code] was necessary since the director of the department refused to promulgate regulations to implement the section."]; Hewlett, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at pp. 544-545; Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. A Free Pregnancy Center (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 633, 639 (Committee to Defend ).) Where, as here, a lawsuit is brought against the very governmental entity and officials who refuse to comply with their admitted statutory responsibilities, the "necessity of private enforcement" portion of the test is readily met. (Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 941; see also Committee to Defend, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 639 ["Where a private suit is brought against a governmental agency or official, the necessity of private enforcement is often obvious. A governmental agency cannot be expected to bring suit against itself. In such situations, private citizens must '"guard the guardians."'"].) Thus, under the "necessity" prong of section 1021.5, the court looks only to the whether there is a need for a private attorney general for enforcement purposes, because no public attorney general is available.

In this case, in which Amy and FTCR joined forces to "guard the guardians," Pasadena insists that, in determining whether an attorneys' fees award is warranted or by whom, the "necessity" portion of the test not only looks to the availability of public enforcement, but weighs the relative contributions of each private guardian. This assertion, for which independent research yields no support, is also unsupported by the authorities on which Pasadena relies.

In Hewlett, the court upheld an award of fees under section 1021.5 to two private plaintiffs, Hewlett and the Sierra Club, who were joined by a district attorney in an action against Squaw Valley Ski Corporation for unlawfully cutting down trees to develop a new ski run. Plaintiffs prevailed and the trial court awarded $480,000 in attorneys' fees to Hewlett, and $192,000 to the Sierra Club. (Hewlett, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at pp. 516- 518.) The dispute on appeal centered "on the question of whether private enforcement was necessary." (Id. at p. 544.) The court found private enforcement was necessary and affirmed the award, based on its agreement with the trial court that the scope and prosecution of the action was beyond the capabilities of the district attorney's office. Hewlett's attorney undertook primary responsibility for the prosecution, and the Sierra Club's counsel provided expertise on the historical and factual background of the action as well as land use and forestry issues. (Id. at pp. 545-546.) The court found the action was not "'opportunistic or collusive'" or "'undertaken simply to generate such attorney fees[,]'" and agreed with the trial court that "the involvement of [both private plaintiffs] was necessary to the successful prosecution of th[e] case." (Id. at pp. 545-546, fn. 31, citation omitted.)

Contrary to Pasadena's supposition that Hewlett "suggest[s] that it is appropriate to analyze the relative contributions made by private parties, even in cases where public enforcement is insufficient," there is no indication the court in Hewlett did or considered doing so in determining fee entitlements. On the contrary, consistent with the test articulated above, the court noted that the "necessity of private enforcement" factor looks only to the adequacy of public enforcement in light of public enforcement efforts, and it did not weigh the relative contributions of the private parties in affirming their fee awards. In addition, Hewlett did not employ the "but for" test to which the trial court in this case subscribed. Rather, it relied on the proper standard, outlined in Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights, which holds that an attorneys' fee award is appropriate unless the private party litigating with a public agency performs only "duplicative, unnecessary, and valueless services," or unless the private action was " 'opportunistic or collusive and undertaken simply to generate such attorney fees.' [citation.]" (Hewlett, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 545, and fn. 31.)

The second case on which Pasadena relies, Crawford, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d 1397, provides even less support for its assertion that the trial court is free to weigh the relative contributions of private parties in determining whether to award private attorney general fees at all. Crawford involved the remedial phase of almost 20 years of school desegregation litigation against the Los Angeles Unified School District. Five private intervenors sought attorneys' fees under section 1021.5. Their requests were denied, and the court of appeal affirmed that ruling. (Id. at pp. 1404, 1410.)

Using a selective quote from Crawford, Pasadena suggests the court's decision was based on its conclusion that the intervenors failed to satisfy the "necessity of private enforcement" criterion in light of the contributions made by other private parties. That is incorrect. The court in Crawford affirmed the denial of the intervenors' attorneys' fee motions because no causal connection was shown between their efforts and the outcome of the litigation. Although the intervenors made significant contributions at the trial level, they failed to satisfy a threshold criterion for a fee award under section 1021.5, and "were not prevailing parties within the meaning of section 1021.5" with respect to the remedial phase of the litigation. (Crawford, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1406, 1410.) Rather, the practical result of the litigation -- the desegregation plan ultimately adopted by the school district -- was achieved as a result of the passage of a ballot proposition, not through the intervenors' efforts. (Id. at p. 1408.)

Moreover, we disagree with Pasadena's assertion that the policies underlying section 1021.5 support a trial court's ability to weigh the contributions of multiple private attorneys general in determining whether each is entitled to attorneys' fees. On the contrary, the policies underlying the intervention and private attorney general statutes support the opposite conclusion. A party who satisfies the criteria for intervention and who contributes to the success of public interest litigation should be entitled to an award of attorneys' fees on the same terms as any other party.

Two basic principles drive this rule. First, when a party qualifies and enters an action as an intervenor, it is vested "with all of the same procedural rights and remedies of the original parties" (Catello v. I.T.T. General Controls (1984) 152 Cal.App .3d 1009, 1013-14), including the right to seek attorneys' fees under section 1021.5 in a public interest lawsuit on equal terms with the original parties. (Crawford, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 1405.) Second, the policy underlying section 1021.5 encourages a party without substantial resources to prosecute actions to vindicate important public constitutional and statutory rights, knowing that if it prevails it will receive financial compensation for its substantial efforts in that endeavor.

By denying attorneys' fees to FTCR because it "probably" would have granted Amy's writ petition anyway, the trial court's ruling undermines both of these policies. The rationale articulated for the ruling would effectively require prospective public interest intervenors to refrain from intervening and to speculate whether the plaintiff and/or the trial court will succeed in protecting their interests and vindicating important public policies implicated in a case, based solely on the pleadings filed by the original plaintiff in his nascent action. Based on those pleadings, if it believes the plaintiff will prevail without its assistance, the prospective intervenor dare not intervene. That conclusion is so because, if it does intervene, and the court agrees with its assessment, the intervenor will incur substantial litigation expenses and fees without any chance of reimbursement under section 1021.5. On the other hand, if the prospective intervenor guesses incorrectly, and the plaintiff loses the action without the intervenor's participation, neither the intervenor's nor the public's interests will have been protected.

Taken together, the policies underlying both the intervention and private attorney general statutes are designed to encourage interested parties who might otherwise lack the resources to aggressively pursue meritorious public interest litigation. The policies are inconsistent with the ruling made by the trial court, which conditions an intervenor's entitlement to private attorney general fees on an after-the-fact assessment of whether the intervenor's participation was "necessary" to the successful result achieved. (Cf., Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State of Wash. (9th Cir.1980) 633 F.2d 1338, 1349-1350 ["It is usually impossible to determine in advance of trial which issues will be reached or which parties will play pivotal roles in the course of the litigation. To retrospectively deny attorney's fees because an issue is not considered or because a party's participation proves unnecessary would have the effect of discouraging the intervention of what in future cases may be essential parties ... [¶] Because an award of attorney's fees in this case is essential to effectuate the congressional purpose of encouraging future constitutional litigation in similar circumstances, we conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in denying intervenors' attorney's fees."].)

We do not hold that a trial court may not consider the relative contributions of multiple private attorneys general when it exercises its discretion to determine the proper amount of an attorneys' fee award. On the contrary, to the extent both the original plaintiff and the intervenor seek to recover fees for time spent that was superfluous to the results achieved by the litigation, or duplicative of one another's efforts, those factors may properly be used to reduce, or perhaps deny altogether, a particular fee request. (See e.g., Crawford, supra, 200 Cal.App .3d at p. 1407 [intervenors who "contribute [ ] little or nothing of substance in producing the outcome" may be denied fees]; Committee to Defend, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 643 [no fees should be awarded to private party that performed "duplicative, unnecessary, and valueless services."].)

In this case, the trial court committed legal error and misinterpreted section 1021.5 by requiring FTCR to show the requested writ relief would not have issued "but for" its participation in the litigation. To be entitled to an attorneys' fees award under section 1021.5, FTCR needed only to show it was a "successful party" in an action that "resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest." Because Pasadena concedes FTCR has satisfied both points, the trial court on remand will be required to exercise its discretion to determine the amount of fees to which FTCR is entitled.

4. FTCR also satisfied the "financial burden" prong of Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, subdivision (b).

The final basis for the trial court's denial of FTCR's attorneys' fee request was its conclusion that FTCR also failed to satisfy the "necessity" prong of section 1021.5, because its substantial personal interest in the outcome outweighed the burdens suffered in litigating the matter. This rationale also was erroneous.

A litigant is entitled to an attorneys' fee award under the "necessity" prong when " 'the cost of the claimant's legal victory transcends [the litigant's] personal interest, that is, when the necessity for pursuing the lawsuit placed a burden in the [claimant] "out of proportion to his individual stake in the matter ." [Citation.]' " (Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 941.)

Pasadena readily acknowledges that FTCR would have been eligible for attorney's fees under section 1021.5 had it initiated litigation to compel the city to comply with Government Code section 34460, rather than intervene in Amy's lawsuit. In its own words, "[Pasadena] admit[ted] at the outset that if intervenors had themselves filed the writ action to compel compliance with Government Code section 34460, there would [have been] little dispute that Intervenors' objective went beyond their own interests to serve the broader public good."

We discern no principled reason for concluding, as did the trial court, that FTCR's stake in a public interest action directed at vindicating the interests of Pasadena voters in implementing the Initiative they approved became purely personal, and therefore sufficient to disqualify it from obtaining attorney's fees, simply because it joined Amy's action rather than filing its own. As the sponsor and proponent of the embattled Initiative, the intervenors -- FTCR and Monsour -- had a " 'personal interest' in the litigation in the broad sense that they were emotionally and intellectually connected to the litigation in ways that the general public was not. But it [was] ridiculous to disqualify them from a fee award because of their 'interest.' If anyone should have gotten fees under section 1021.5, they should have...." (Hammond v. Agran (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 115, 125-126.) For purposes of determining a public interest litigant's entitlement to private attorney general fees, the question is whether "the cost of litigation [was] out of proportion to the individual litigant's stake in the litigation?" (Punsly, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 117; Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 941.) The financial burdens on FTCR of litigating this matter unquestionably outweighed the organization's ideological interest in implementing the voters' will. Numerous cases have concluded that ballot measure proponents, with no financial or personal interests at stake, qualified for section 1021.5 fee awards in actions brought to enforce those measures or qualify them for the ballot. (See Press, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 321; Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 213, 228-232; Washburn v. City of Berkeley (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 578, 584-586.) For purposes of determining FTCR's entitlement to private attorney general fees, no principled reason exists to treat this case any differently, simply due to the timing of FTCR's intervention. To the extent the trial court finds, as a factual matter, that FTCR's efforts in obtaining the writ of mandate duplicated those of Amy, that factor is properly considered in determining the amount of attorneys' fees, rather than the entitlement to fees. [FN 27]

[FN 27] We will not address Pasadena's contention that the trial court's order denying fees to FTCR may be upheld because FTCR's "reputational interest" in ensuring the implementation of the Initiative in Pasadena, which would assist its future ability to promote and obtain passage of the Initiative in other cities, outweighed the financial burdens involved in joining this action. This argument was not raised or ruled on below, and the record contains no evidence that would support the city's factual contention. (See e.g., Families Unafraid to Uphold Rural El Dorado County v. Board of Supervisors (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 505, 516, original emphasis [a party's non-pecuniary interest is insufficient to block an attorney's fees award under the financial burden criterion unless it is "specific, concrete and significant, and these attributes must be based on objective evidence."].)

The matter must be remanded to the trial court to review FTCR's motion for attorneys' fees under section 1021.5 using the appropriate legal principles, and to properly exercise its discretion with respect to the application of the principles to the facts.

DISPOSITION

The order dismissing the Santa Monica action is affirmed. In the Pasadena action, the orders denying the anti-SLAPP motion, and granting the motion for summary judgment are reversed. The order denying Monsour and FTCR's motion for attorneys' fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 is also reversed, and matter remanded for reconsideration under the principles outlined above. FTCR is to recover its attorneys' fees and costs on appeal.

We concur: COOPER, P.J., and FLIER, J.