Statutes

Civil Rights Law 70-a and 76-a
New York's anti-SLAPP statute, enacted 1992.

NYCPLR 3211(g) and 3212(h)
These two N.Y. Civil Practice rules establish standards for motions for dismissal and summary judgment in SLAPP cases.

Cases

Appellate Courts

West Branch Conservation Association v. Town of Clarkstown
N.Y. Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 1995 (222 A.D.2d 513, 636 N.Y.S.2d 61)

The West Branch Conservation Association sued a local planning board and a land developer, challenging the conclusion of the local planning board that a planned subdivision would not have a significant effect on the environment. The developer filed a counterclaim for abuse of process. The Appellate Division affirms the trial court's dismissal of the counterclaim but also affirms the trial court's denial of attorney fees, holding that fees may be awarded at the discretion of the court and are not mandatory under the state's anti-SLAPP statute.

Trial Courts

Harfenes v. Sea Gate Association
N.Y. Supreme Court, 1995 (647 N.Y.S. 2d 329, 167 Misc.2d 647)

Members of a homeowners association sued the association to recover damages under the state's anti-SLAPP statute for an earlier suit brought against the members by the association, which the members claimed was retaliatory for their own suit challenging the propriety of a loan to the association. The members and the association had fought over liability for the cost of removing concrete, asphalt, brick, and metal bars which the association had improperly deposited along the community's shoreline to protect against harmful wave action. The court held that the anti-SLAPP statute is in derogation of the common law and thus must be construed narrowly. It further held that the homeowners' earlier suit had not been an "action involving public petition and participation" as required by the statute, and therefore the subsequent suit by the association did not qualify as a SLAPP.

In the Matter of Entertainment Partners Group, Inc. v. Davis
N.Y. Supreme Court, 1992 (590 N.Y.S.2d 979)

Action for defamation and tortuous interference with prospective relations. Plaintiff brought suit against individual leaders of a neighborhood block association who opposed its application for a special zoning permit to operate a restaurant and nightclub. The court held, having previously dismissed the suit under the anti-SLAPP statute, that the statute authorized the award of costs and attorney's fees.)

In the Matter of Gordon v. Marrone
N.Y. Supreme Court, 1992 (590 N.Y.S.2d 649)

Reargument of the award of attorneys fees and expenses. The court held that, under the SLAPP statute, the award of attorneys fees and expenses for frivolous conduct, based on the prosecution of a colorable claim for an improper purpose, does not violate the Petition Clause of the First Amendment. "SLAPP suits function by forcing the target into the judicial arena where the SLAPP filer foists upon the target the expenses of a defense. The longer the litigation can be stretched out, the more litigation that can be churned, the greater the expense that is inflicted, and the closer the SLAPP filer moves to success.... Short of a gun to the head, a greater threat to First Amendment expression can scarcely be imagined.")

Resources

McBride, Edward W., Jr. "The Empire State SLAPPs Back: New York's Legislative Response to SLAPP Suits." 17 Vermont Law Review 925 (1993)