- S.A. v. Maiden
(2014, 4th District – 229 Cal.App.4th 27, 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 567) - Salma v. Capon
(2008, 1st District – 161 Cal.App.4th 1275, 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 873) - Sanchez v. Bezos
(2022, 2d District – 80 Cal.App.5th 750) - San Diegans for Open Government v. Har Construction, Inc.
(2015, 4th District – 240 Cal.App.4th 611, 192 Cal.Rptr.3d 559) - San Ramon Valley Fire Protection District v. Contra Costa County Employees’ Retirement Association
(2004, 1st District – 125 Cal.App.4th 343, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 724) - A complaint seeking judicial review of an action or decision by a public entity is not subject to a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute. The action is not itself an exercise of the public entity’s right of free speech or petition.
- Sandlin v. McLaughlin
(2020, 4th District – 50 Cal.App.5th 805, 263 Cal.Rptr.3d 874) - Santa Barbara County Coalition Against Automobile Subsidies v. Santa Barbara County Association of Governments
(2008, 2d District – 167 Cal.App.4th 1229, 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 714) - Santa Clara Waste Water Company v. County of Ventura Environmental Health Division
(2017, 2d District – 17 Cal.App.5th 1082, 225 Cal.Rptr.3d 885) - Santa Monica Rent Control Board v. Pearl Street, LLC
(2003, 2d District – 109 Cal.App.4th 1308, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 903) - The Board filed this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that state and local rent control law were violated by defendants. At issue is whether, in light of facts presented to the Board, defendants are entitled to charge market rate for rental of certain units. The trial court granted defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint. The appellate court reverses on the grounds that the basis of the suit — defendants’ filing of notices of their intention to re-rent units at market rates — is not an act by defendants in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech and therefore is not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.
- Save Westwood Village v. Luskin
(2014, 2d District – 233 Cal.App.4th 135, 182 Cal.Rptr.3d 328) - Scalzo v. American Express Co.
(2010, 2d District – 185 Cal.App.4th 91, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 638) - Schaffer v. City and County of San Francisco
(2008, 1st Distrct – 168 Cal.App.4th 992, 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 880) - Schoendorf v. U.D. Registry, Inc.
(2002, 2d District – 97 Cal.App.4th 227, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 313) - UDR is a consumer reporting agency that gathers and sells information about unlawful detainer cases. Schoendorf, a tenant, after unsuccessfully attempting to have UDR amend information about her in UDR’s records, sued UDR for acts of negligence. The trial court granted the defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion, on the grounds that UDR had a constitutionally protected right to disseminate information found in court records. The appellate court reverses on the grounds that the information gathered by UDR does not come exclusively from court records. In addition, the court holds, UDR has a duty under both state and federal credit reporting statutes, which require “maximum accuracy” in credit reports, and this duty is not abrogated or reduced by any First Amendment rights. (See also Decker v. The U.D. Registry, Inc. (2003)
- Schroeder v. City Council of the City of Irvine
(2002, 4th District – 97 Cal.App.4th 174, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 330) - Schroeder sued the Irvine City Council over the council’s approval of funds for a voter registration drive (Vote 2000), alleging that the program was a ruse to campaign for a county measure concerning development of an abandoned military airbase. The trial court granted defendants’ special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute, ruling that the plaintiff had not shown a likelihood of proving that the expenditures for Vote 2000 were unlawful political expenditures. Schroeder appealed, arguing that if his demonstration of the likelihood of prevailing on his claims was deficient it was because he was denied permission to conduct “specified discovery” that would have produced evidence the expenditures were unlawful. In addition, he argued that the anti-SLAPP statute’s provision for attorney fees for the prevailing party should be construed as permissive or declared unconstitutional. The appellate court concludes that Schroeder had not shown good cause to conduct specified discovery; materials sought by Schroeder were either readily available without the device of discovery or were irrelevant to his claims as a matter of law. The court also upholds the constitutionality of the anti-SLAPP statute’s provision for mandatory attorney fees.
- Schwarzburd v. Kensington Police Protection & Community Services Dist.
(2014, 1st District – 225 Cal.App.4th 1345, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 899) - Scott v. Metabolife International, Inc.
(2004, 3d District – 115 Cal.App.4th 404, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 242) - Scott sued Metabolife for damages for false and deceitful advertising, alleging that she was injured by a Metabolife product. Metabolife filed a motion to strike the complaint, arguing that the causes of action arose from its advertising, labeling, marketing, and promoting of its product, activities protected by the First Amendment. The trial court denied the motion to strike the complaint for false advertising on the grounds that “applying [the anti-SLAPP statute] to advertising would be stretching the definition of that statute to its outermost boundaries.” The appellate court affirms on the grounds that Metabolife’s advertising of its products for profit does not concern an issue of public interest as required by the anti-SLAPP statute. (Between the trial court’s ruling and the time this matter was heard in oral argument before the appellate court, California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17 became law. Under section 425.17, commercial advertising is not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.) (See also Martinez v. Metabolife International, Inc., 4th District Court of Appeal (2003); Brenton v. Metabolife International, Inc., 4th District Court of Appeal (2004).)
- Seelig v. Infinity Broadcasting Corp.
(2002, 1st District – 97 Cal.App.4th 798, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 108) - Seelig participated in a TV show, “Who Wants to Marry a Multimillionaire.” Before the broadcast Seelig was invited to appear on a radio talk show. She declined. The radio program hosts discussed on the air her refusal to be interviewed. Seelig sued the radio program hosts and the broadcast station owners for damages, alleging defamation and other causes. The defendants filed both a demurrer and a special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion. The appellate court reverses, concluding that the anti-SLAPP statute applies to the radio broadcast and plaintiff could not prevail on the merits of her claims, since none of the alleged defamatory statements were actionable statements of fact.
- Seltzer v. Barnes
(2010, 1st District – 182 Cal.App.4th 953, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 290) - Serova v. Sony Music Entertainment
(2020, 2d District – 44 Cal.App.5th 103, 257 Cal.Rptr.3d 398) - Shahbazian v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes
(2017, 2d District – 17 Cal.App.5th 823, 225 Cal.Rptr.3d 772) - Sheley v. Harrop
(2017, 3d District – 9 Cal.App.5th 1197, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 606) - Shekhter v. Financial Indemnity Co.
(2001, 2d District – 89 Cal.App.4th 141, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 843) - Financial sued a number of persons, including Shekhter, alleging insurance fraud. The suit was settled, with the condition that all information relating to the suit be kept confidential. Later, in the present case, Allstate Insurance filed a complaint against Shekhter alleging insurance fraud. Shekhter filed a cross-complaint against Allstate but also Financial Indemnity, its lawyers, and others. Shekhter alleged inter alia that the conduct of Financial’s lawyers in the earlier suit against him included unfair business practices and violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. Motions by different defendants to strike specific causes of action in the cross-complaint were denied by the trial court. The appellate court reversed. Held: a special motion to strike can apply toa single cause of action when other claims remain to be resolved. Additionally, actions by an attorney on behalf of a SLAPP target fall within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute. In this case because the actions alleged to be unfair business practices and violations of the Unruh Act arose in connection with the prosecution of a lawsuit, they were actions in furtherance of the right of petition and thus covered by the anti-SLAPP statute.
- Sheppard v. Lightpost Museum Fund
(2006, 6th District – 146 Cal.App.4th 315, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 821) - Siam v. Kizilbash
(2005, 6th District – 130 Cal.App.4th 1563, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 368) - Kizilbash accused Siam of abusing his two sons, reporting him to public officials. He also filed a civil harassment petition against Siam. In turn, Siam sued Kizilbash for defamation and malicious prosecution among other causes of action. The trial court denied Kizilbash’s motion to dismiss the entire complaint as a SLAPP. The appellate court upholds the order except for the claim of malicious prosecution, holding that such a claim may not be based on a civil harassment petition. In addition, the court holds that the “litigation privilege” (Civil Code section 47) is overriden by liability for false reporting under the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (Penal Code section 11164 et seq.).
- Silk v. Feldman
(2012, 2d District – 208 Cal.App.4th 547) - Simmons v. Allstate Insurance Co.
(2001, 3d District – 92 Cal.App.4th 1068, 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 397) - Simmons filed a cross-complaint for defamation after Allstate sued him for unfair business practices (alleging that Simmons had overtreated patients covered by Allstate). The trial court granted a special motion to strike the cross-complaint. On appeal, Simmons claimed that the trial court erred in refusing to grant him leave to amend the cross-complaint after the court had granted the motion. Held: allowing a SLAPP plaintiff to amend the complaint would undermine the anti-SLAPP statute’s purpose of providing for quick dismissal of meritless lawsuits.
- Simmons v. Bauer Media Group USA, LLC
(2020, 2d District – 50 Cal.App.5th 1037, 263 Cal.Rptr.3d 903) - Singh v. Lipworth
(2014, 3d District – 227 Cal.App.4th 813, 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 131) - Sipple v. Foundation for National Progress
(1999, 2d District – 71 Cal.App.4th 226, 83 Cal.Rptr. 677) - The magazine “Mother Jones” published an article about a custody battle, ostensibly to show how rich and powerful men may use the legal system to their advantage over women who may have been abused by them. The subject of the article sued the magazine for defamation. The appellate court upholds the trial court’s dismissal of the suit following a special motion to strike the complaint. The court concluded that the subject of the article was not the private affair of an individual but a public proceeding involving public issues. “[T]he issues of spousal abuse generated in the custody proceedings are of public interest when the person accused of the abuse is a nationally known figure identified with morality campaigns for national leaders ….” The defendant argued that there was a probability he would prevail on his defamation claim because not all of the magazine article was privileged under Civil Code section 47, which confers an absolute privilege on any fair and true report of a judicial proceeding. The court rejected this argument on the grounds that the defendant has made his case if he can establish by the evidence that the gist of the alleged defamatory statements is justified.
- Six4Three, LLC v. Facebook, Inc.
(2020, 1st District – 49 Cal.App.5th 109, 262 Cal.Rptr.3d 594) - Slaney v. Ranger Insurance Co.
(2004, 2d District – 115 Cal.App.4th 306, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 915) - Slaney prepared an estimate for repair of an aircraft in support of a claim by third parties presented to Ranger Insurance. The company denied the claim on grounds that the claim was fraudulently excessive and sued the insureds and Slaney for bad faith. Slaney’s motion for summary judgment was granted and he was dismissed from the suit. The insureds subsequently received a judgment against the company as well as punitive damages for malicious denial of their claim. Slaney then brought this action for malicious prosecution. The trial court denied the company’s anti-SLAPP motion after concluding that Slaney presented sufficient evidence to establish a probability of prevailing on his complaint. The appellate court affirms. According to the court, the underlying judgment against the company, which included a finding of malice and an award of punitive damages, demonstrated a potential for recovery in the present case.
- Slauson Partnership v. Ochoa
(2003, 2d District – 112 Cal.App.4th 1005, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 668) - The owner of a mini-mall filed a complaint for injunctive relief against Ochoa, alleging he had organized ongoing demonstrations against one of the mall’s tenants, a club that produced nude shows. Ochoa filed an anti-SLAPP motion, but a month later the parties stipulated to an injunction that regulated the manner of the demonstrations. Ochoa’s motion was tabled to allow time for the injunction to be tested and reviewed by the court. After a month and a half, the trial court, based on testimony about the conduct of the demonstrations, denied the anti-SLAPP motion on the grounds that plaintiffs had succeeded in demonstrating a probability of succeeding on its claim. In a lengthy opinion, the appellate court affirms, ruling that the trial court did not err in considering the same evidence for both the motion to strike and the injunction.
- Smith v. Adventist Health System/West
(2010, 5th District – 190 Cal.App.4th 40, 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 805) - Sonoma Media Investments, LLC v. Superior Court
(2019, 1st District – 34 Cal.App.5th 24, 247 Cal.Rptr.3d 5) - South Sutter, LLC v. LJ Sutter Partners, L.P.
(2011, 3d District – 193 Cal.App.4th 634) - Southern California Gas Co. v. Flannery
(2014, 2d District – 232 Cal.App.4th 477, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 436) - Spencer v. Mowat
(2020, 2d District – 46 Cal.App.5th 1024, 260 Cal.Rptr.3d 372) - Sprengel v. Zbylut
(2015, 2d District – 241 Cal.App.4th 140, 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 407) - (modified 10-29-15)
- Squires v. City of Eureka
(2014, 1st District – 231 Cal.App.4th 577, 180 Cal.Rptr.3d 10) - Stafford v. Attending Staff Assn. of LAC + USC Medical Center
(2019, 2d District – 41 Cal.App.5th 629, 254 Cal.Rptr.3d 369) - StaffPro, Inc. v. Elite Show Services, Inc.
(2006, 4th District – 136 Cal.App.4th 1392, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 682) - StaffPro filed a malicious prosecution suit against Elite which responded with an anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court granted Elite’s motion, ruling that StaffPro failed to carry its burden of establishing a probability that it would prevail because it had not shown favorable termination or probable cause. The appellate court affirmed, holding that a severability analysis is improper in determining whether a malicious prosecution plaintiff has demonstrated favorable termination of an underlying lawsuit. Thus, since the first cause of action in the underlying suit had not terminated in favor of StaffPro, it could not demonstrate favorable termination, and therefore could not prevail in its malicious prosecution suit.
- Starr v. Ashbrook
(2023, 4th District – 87 Cal.App.5th 999, 304 Cal.Rptr.3d 275) - Starview Property, LLC v. Lee
(2019, 2d District – 41 Cal.App.5th 203, 254 Cal.Rptr.3d 58) - State Farm General Insurance Co. v. Majorino
(2002, 2d District – 99 Cal.App.4th 974, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 719) - Majorino and O’Brien sued several people after they were allegedly assaulted during a party at a private home. The home’s owners were among the named defendants; the owners tendered their defense to State Farm under their homeowner policy. State Farm then filed an action for declaratory relief, seeking a judicial determination of its duty to indemnify the homeowners. In turn, Majorino and O’Brien filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that State Farm’s action was designed to chill their right to petition for legal redress. The trial court denied the motion, and the appellate court affirmed, concluding that Majorino and O’Brien had failed to demonstrate that State Farm’s action for declaratory relief qualified as a SLAPP under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. “[T]he act which underlies and forms the basis for State Farm’s declaratory relief action is not the personal injury lawsuit filed by appellants, but the [homeowners’] tender of the defense of that lawsuit under a policy that contains an arguably applicable exclusionary clause.”
- State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Lee
(2011, 3d District – 193 Cal.App.4th 34, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 183) - Steadman v. Osborne
(2009, 4th District – 178 Cal.App.4th 950, 100 Cal.Rptr.3d 724) - Steed v. Department of Consumer Affairs
(2012, 2d District – 204 Cal.App.4th 112, 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 519) - Stenehjem v. Sareen
(2014, 6th District – 226 Cal.App.4th 1405, 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 173) - Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC
(2010, 1st District – 181 Cal.App.4th 664, 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 98) - Suarez v. Trigg Laboratories, Inc.
(2016, 2d District – 3 Cal.App.5th 118, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 411) - Sugarman v. Benett
(2021, 2d District – 73 Cal.App.5th 165, 288 Cal.Rptr.3d 174) -
Sugarman v. Brown
(2021, 2d District – 73 Cal.App.5th 152, 288 Cal.Rptr.3d 165) - Summerfiled v. Randolph
(2011, 2d District – 201 Cal.App.4th 127) - Sunset Millennium Associates, LLC v. Le Songe, LLC
(2006, 2d District – 138 Cal.App.4th 256, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 273) - Sunset Millennium Associates v. LHO Grafton Hotel
(2006, 2d District – 146 Cal.App.4th 300, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 828) - Supershuttle International, Inc. v. Labor & Workforce Development Agency
(2019, 2d District – 40 Cal.App.5th 1058, 253 Cal.Rptr.3d 666) - Swanson v. County of Riverside
(2019, 4th District – 36 Cal.App.5th 361, 248 Cal.Rptr.3d 476) - Sycamore Ridge Apartments LLC v. Naumann
(2007, 4th District – 157 Cal.App.4th 1385, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 561) - Sylmar Air Conditioning v. Pueblo Contracting Services, Inc.
(2004, 2d District – 122 Cal.App.4th 1049, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 882) - In response to Pueblo’s lawsuit against it, Sylmar filed a cross-complaint alleging fraud among other actions. Pueblo filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the cross-complaint for fraud. Before the hearing on the motion, Sylmar filed an amended cross-complaint. The trial court granted the anti-SLAPP motion. On appeal Sylmar argued that its amended cross-complaint made the anti-SLAPP motion moot. The appellate court holds that a plaintiff may not avoid a hearing on an anti-SLAPP motion by filing an amended pleading, and thus, if the motion is granted, may not avoid the mandatory award of costs and attorney fees to the SLAPP target.
- Symmonds v. Mahoney
(2019, 2d District – 31 Cal.App.5th 1096, 243 Cal.Rptr.3d 445)
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